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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Labor practices have become a part of many international trade agreements. In response to 
growing interest in international labor standards, the Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor 
Affairs (ILAB) engaged the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to 
recommend a method to monitor and evaluate labor conditions in a country. The focus was on five labor 
standards: (1) Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining; (2) Forced or Compulsory Labor; (3) 
Child Labor; (4) Discrimination; and (5) Acceptable Conditions of Work. NAS developed an approach 
which included formulating indicators for each of the five labor standards, creating a database of sources 
of reliable empirical information for assessing these indicators, and suggesting a method for assessing 
and monitoring compliance that includes a matrix framework for graphically presenting assessments. 
The University of Michigan, in consultation with ILAB, evaluated this approach by having 3-person expert 
panels apply it to assessing and monitoring compliance in three countries. The panel members 
independently assessed the indicators in terms of level of compliance with international standards 
(“some problems,” “more extensive problems,” or “severe problems) and direction of change (“steady 
state,” “improving,” or “worsening”). Each panel then convened to discuss their assessments and seek to 
resolve differences in those assessments. 
Observation and analysis of this experience revealed challenges in applying this approach and potential 
modifications that could improve its operationalization. For most of the indicators, there was not 
agreement among the independent assessments by the panel members. Information was lacking or 
outdated for many of the indicators and, when present, was usually not definitive. Panelists raised a 
number of suggestions for changes in the indicators and matrix approach, more generally. WebMILS, the 
database created to support such assessments, was seen as a useful resource, although concerns were 
raised about limiting information sources to those that are available on the Internet. There were also 
suggestions for updating and modifying the version of WebMILS that was operational during the period of 
the evaluation. The panelists felt that the process they followed (independent assessments followed by a 
group meeting) was effective, although there was some feeling that more training might be helpful before 
undertaking the independent assessments. 
The evaluation experience also focused on the challenges of moving from an assessment of individual 
indicators using the matrix formulation to overall conclusions about a country’s compliance with 
international labor standards. The formulation of discrete indicators for each labor standard provides a 
basis for a more explicated or transparent discussion of compliance. But the proposed method does not 
provide guidance for integrating conclusions about individual indicators into a broader assessment of a 
country’s compliance with international standards. This issue raises important questions about the 
relative importance of different indicators and whether priorities could be established to direct such an 
effort. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Labor practices have become a part of many international trade agreements.  In 
response to growing interest in international labor standards, the Department of Labor’s 
Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) engaged the National Research Council of 
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to recommend a method to monitor and 
evaluate labor conditions in a country.  The focus was on five labor standards:  (1) 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining; (2) Forced or Compulsory Labor; (3) 
Child Labor; (4) Discrimination; and (5) Acceptable Conditions of Work.  NAS 
developed an approach which included formulating indicators for each of the five labor 
standards, creating a database of sources of reliable empirical information for assessing 
these indicators, and suggesting a method for assessing and monitoring compliance that 
includes a matrix framework for graphically presenting assessments.   
 
The University of Michigan, in consultation with ILAB, evaluated this approach 
by having 3-person expert panels apply it to assessing and monitoring compliance in 
three countries.  The panel members independently assessed the indicators in terms of 
level of compliance with international standards (“some problems,” “more extensive 
problems,” or “severe problems) and direction of change (“steady state,” “improving,” or 
“worsening”).  Each panel then convened to discuss their assessments and seek to resolve 
differences in those assessments. 
 
Observation and analysis of this experience revealed challenges in applying this 
approach and potential modifications that could improve its operationalization.  For most 
of the indicators, there was not agreement among the independent assessments by the 
panel members.  Information was lacking or outdated for many of the indicators and, 
when present, was usually not definitive.  Panelists raised a number of suggestions for 
changes in the indicators and matrix approach, more generally.  WebMILS, the database 
created to support such assessments, was seen as a useful resource, although concerns 
were raised about limiting information sources to those that are available on the Internet.  
There were also suggestions for updating and modifying the version of WebMILS that 
was operational during the period of the evaluation.  The panelists felt that the process 
they followed (independent assessments followed by a group meeting) was effective, 
although there was some feeling that more training might be helpful before undertaking 
the independent assessments.   
 
The evaluation experience also focused on the challenges of moving from an 
assessment of individual indicators using the matrix formulation to overall conclusions 
about a country’s compliance with international labor standards.  The formulation of 
discrete indicators for each labor standard provides a basis for a more explicated or 
transparent discussion of compliance.  But the proposed method does not provide 
guidance for integrating conclusions about individual indicators into a broader 
assessment of a country’s compliance with international standards.  This issue raises 
important questions about the relative importance of different indicators and whether 
priorities could be established to direct such an effort. 
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International trade is a major element of most national economies.  In 2007, U.S. 
exports and imports represented 12.2 percent and 17.0 percent, respectively, of the gross 
domestic product (GDP)—and these figures are projected to double in thirty years.1  
With this expansion, international trade agreements have also grown in importance and 
scope.  Labor conditions and environmental standards are now a part of the discussion of 
provisions in bilateral and multilateral agreements, regional trade pacts, and special trade 
remedies.   
Incorporating labor standards in trade pacts reflects both moral and practical 
considerations.  Advocates for inclusion of such provisions argue that unfair labor 
practices and exploitation of vulnerable workers should not be a part of any country’s 
competitive advantage.  Those arguing against incorporating labor standards into trade 
agreements raise concerns about protectionism and other potential adverse impacts on 
trade.  For both advocates and critics, however, there are also questions about how such 
provisions would be implemented.  Are there effective and fair ways to assess and 
monitor compliance with international labor standards by trading partners? 
In 2001 the Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) 
engaged the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to 
recommend an approach to assessing and monitoring labor conditions in a country.  The 
focus was on five labor standards: 
1. Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
2. Forced or Compulsory Labor 
3. Child Labor 
4. Discrimination 
5. Acceptable Conditions of Work 
The first four are “core labor standards,” as defined by the International Labor 
Organization (ILO).  These are considered “core” because of their broad acceptance 
internationally and the general consensus that these standards should be met irrespective 
of the standard of living or economic resources of a country.  The fifth labor standard, 
“acceptable conditions of work,” has emerged in the context of U.S. trade discussions and 
includes wage levels, hours of work, and health and safety provisions.   
The National Research Council established a Committee on Monitoring 
International Standards to direct the effort to develop an approach to assessing 
compliance within a country.  The result of that effort includes:  
a. an explication of the five labor standards, including the formulation of a set of 
discrete indicators for each labor standard; 
b. a database of sources of information for assessing these indicators; and 
                                                 
1 Morrison, W.M. and Cooper, W.H, (2008).  The Future Role of U.S. Trade Policy: An Overview (RS22914).  
Washington, DC:  Congressional Research Service (CRS). 
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c. a matrix framework for graphically presenting assessments of indicators and for 
facilitating discussion of compliance with international standards. 
The work of the Committee and its conclusions are documented in several publications, 
including an overview volume, Monitoring International Labor Standards.2
The indicators developed for each of the five labor standards are grouped into 
three categories, reflecting the legal framework in a country, government performance 
with respect to these indicators (e.g., resources devoted to enforcement of labor 
provisions), and overall outcomes in the country.  For example, there are thirty-eight 
indicators for Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining:  twenty-one for the 
legal framework; thirteen for government performance; and four indicators of overall 
outcomes.  The total number of indicators varies across labor standard.  Freedom of 
Association3 has the most, with thirty-eight indicators, and Forced or Compulsory Labor, 
with sixteen indicators, has the fewest. 
The NAS-ILAB project also created WebMILS, an electronic database addressing 
international labor standards and the assessment of indicators.  WebMILS includes 
general information about labor standards and compliance, as well as the indicators 
formulated by the NAS project for assessing the individual labor standards.  The database 
provides an overview of the NAS’s recommendations, including many excerpts from 
Monitoring International Labor Standards.  A key element of the database is its links to 
external sites for researching the indicators to assess compliance.  WebMILS is 
implemented on the ILAB section of the Department of Labor’s website: 
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/webmils/ 
The third element of the NAS-ILAB approach is a “matrix” formulation, which 
calls for assessing each of the indicators in terms of the level of compliance with 
standards (some problems, more extensive problems, and severe problems) and whether 
problems with compliance are worsening, improving, or staying the same.  Based on 
these two dimensions, each indicator can be placed in a cell in a 3x3 matrix in figure 1, 
below: 
Figure 1:  NAS-ILAB Matrix Framework 
 Improving Steady State Worsening 
Some 
   problems 
   
More extensive 
   problems 
   
Severe 
   problems 
   
 
 
                                                 
2 National Research Council (2004). Monitoring International Labor Standards:  Techniques and Sources 
of Information. Washington, DC:  The National Academies Press. 
3 In this report, “Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining” is sometimes shortened to “Freedom 
of Association” for ease of expression.   
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Although assessment of some indicators is relatively straightforward (e.g., 
whether a particular ILO convention has been ratified), most assessments rely on at least 
some element of subjectivity on the part of the individual assessor.  The NAS committee 
did not suggest specific guidelines for operationalizing the levels of compliance because 
they felt it would not be possible “to set thresholds that are appropriate for every country 
and every situation.” (Monitoring International Labor Standards, p. 28)  Rather, they 
provide general guidance for assessing the indicators.  “Some problems” are situations in 
which these problems are “not so frequent, broad, or severe as to seriously undermine 
compliance.”  At the other extreme, an indicator has “severe” problems when compliance 
with international standards is “difficult or impossible.” “More extensive problems” 
refers to situations that fall between those two—“problems that are serious enough to 
raise questions about compliance in important areas or for particular groups, but not 
across the board” (p. 28).  Criteria for assessing direction of change are not discussed. 
Based on the hypothetical example provided in the text, the committee envisions a 
process in which individuals would independently assess the indicators and then come 
together to discuss differences in their assessments.  In this way, the matrix provides a 
visual, heuristic framework for displaying the ratings of indicators and a means for 
comparing the rating of two or more assessors.  This NAS-ILAB matrix approach was 
developed by the Committee as a “middle-road” between a “precise scoring or ranking” 
of a country and a strictly qualitative effort:  “the matrix framework…makes the value 
judgments and data interpretations of assessors explicit and exposes them to challenges 
and debate” (p. 32).  Although the report describes the matrix layout “as one possible 
way to analyze the data” (p. 27), it is the only method that the Committee posits for 
displaying assessments of the indicators and comparing and/or discussing differences 




The NAS report and matrix framework provides a general direction for an 
assessment method based on independent assessments followed by a meeting (or other 
process) to discuss and seek to resolve differences in assessments.  The first step in the 
evaluation was to translate this general goal into a work plan.  The overall structure 
agreed upon with ILAB called for the formation of three panels, made up of three labor 
rights experts, with each panel assessing indicators for one country.  The individual panel 
members would independently rate the indicators and then convene for a one-day 
meeting to discuss their ratings and to seek to resolve differences.   
In order to get a better idea of what the individual assessments would involve, the 
research team undertook an initial analysis of indicators for one country both to identify 
any issues associated with this process and to estimate the time needed to assess 
indicators.  This initial analysis also suggested the importance of developing orientation 
materials and data input tools to assist individual panelists with the task of assessing a 
large number of indicators:  keeping track of their progress and ensuring that indicators 
were not overlooked in the assessment process.  The evaluation also sought to assess 
WebMILS as a primary tool for obtaining information about compliance within a 
country.  The steps in the evaluation process are shown in figure 2, below. 
Figure 2:  Steps in the Evaluation Process 
Select Countries


















and online data 
entry forms
 
Selection of countries and labor standards assignment  
In consultation with ILAB, three countries were selected.  The countries used in 
the pilot testing of the matrix methodology are not identified in this report.  This is to 
ensure that the focus remains on the evaluation of the method and not on the panels’ 
findings for the test countries.  Although at different stages of development, all three are 
generally considered “developing” countries.  Their populations range in size from 30 
million to well over 100 million people.  They represent different regions, levels of 
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export activity, and labor rights traditions.  The countries are referred to as Country A, 
Country B and Country C in this report.  
Given the limited time available during a one-day group meeting for discussion, it 
was determined that instead of each panel assessing all of the labor standards—a total of 
150 separate indicators for the five labor standards—each panel would assess two labor 
standards.  All three panels would assess the indicators for Freedom of Association and 
Collective Bargaining.  In addition, each panel would assess a second indicator.  The 
assignments were: 
Country A panel: Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
 Acceptable Conditions of Work 
Country B panel: Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
 Forced or Compulsory Labor 
Country C panel: Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
 Discrimination 
This design permitted a comparison of the assessment experience for one labor standard 
across the three panels/countries, as well as addressing three other labor standards.4
Recruitment and selection of expert panelists 
For each country, a three-person panel was recruited.  Suggestions for potential 
panelists were gathered from ILAB personnel, discussions with labor rights NGOs, 
corporate social responsibility personnel, and academic researchers.  The backgrounds of 
the nine panelists who eventually participated on the three panels included: 
Country A panel: 
• Professor of industrial relations, with teaching and research experience in 
international and comparative labor relations and human rights 
• Professor of law, with focus on international and comparative law, 
including work on labor rights in central and eastern Europe 
• Union-based analyst and program director with focus on international 
labor conditions and extensive field experience in Asia and Europe 
Country B panel: 
• Independent consultant on corporate social responsibility, with policy and 
field experience in labor rights compliance in international supply chains 
• Independent consultant on labor conditions and labor rights, with 
experience working with the NGOs and the U.S. government, particularly 
on programs in Africa 
                                                 
4 It was decided that the panels in this pilot test would not assess the indicators for child labor.  One factor 
in this logistical decision was the fact that the Department of Labor already has extensive efforts underway 
on child labor. 
 6
• Former ILO official with extensive experience in labor rights, including 
field, administrative, and policy responsibilities 
Country C panel: 
• Business school professor teaching U.S. and international labor law, with 
field experience working on labor rights in south and southeast Asia 
• Executive for the U.S. office of a major international union organization, 
with experience working on labor rights issues with trade union bodies 
and business groups 
• Senior program advisor with several labor rights NGOs, with experience 
training U.S. government officials on labor rights and assessment 
techniques  
Each panel included at least one individual who had direct labor rights experience in the 
country being assessed.   
Development and distribution of materials for the panelists 
Once the panels were formed, each panelist was sent an orientation package.  This 
included a description of the project, their responsibilities as a panelist, and a brief 
introduction to WebMILS (see Appendix A).  They were also provided a copy of the 
Monitoring International Labor Standards text and a bound set of assessment forms for 
those indicators that they were responsible for assessing.  An example of a hard-copy 
assessment form is displayed in Appendix B.   
The individualized bound set of forms was intended as a tool for the panelist to 
facilitate the rating process.  An online data entry system was created for the actual 
recording of their assessments (see Appendix C).  This online system was the basis for 
collecting the assessments of the panelists prior to their meeting.  The hard-copy forms, 
in addition to serving as a “workbook” for the panelists, provided a backup of each 
panelist’s ratings that could be used in case there were technical problems with the online 
system. 
In addition to the assessment of level of compliance and direction of change, the 
hard-copy and online system collected additional information from the panelists.  For 
each indicator, they were asked whether they used sources from outside the WebMILS 
database and, if so, what sources they used.  An open-ended field was provided for 
recording any comments about assessing the indicator.  The panelists were also asked to 
indicate how confident they were in making the assessment:  “low confidence” (the 
assessment is highly speculative); “moderate confidence” (some objective evidence); and 
“confident” (clear indications, strong objective evidence).  The level of confidence 
question was added for two reasons.  First, it was intended to provide more information 
about their individual assessments.  The second reason was to encourage the panelists to 
make an assessment even if they did not feel that they had strong evidence—a common 
situation based on the experience of the test analysis undertaken by the research team. 
 7
Individual assessments by panelists 
The panelists received their written instructions for the analysis in late February, 
with instructions that the assessments were to be submitted at least five days before the 
day of their respective panel meetings in early May.  During this period, there were a few 
communications from individual panelists, but the research team minimized any feedback 
that might influence their individual ratings.   
After the panelists submitted their assessments, they were interviewed by 
telephone before they convened for their panelist meeting.  This pre-panel interview 
asked about reactions to the assessment process and the use of WebMILS.  These 
interviews generally lasted from thirty-minutes to an hour.  Appendix D lists the 
questions used in this pre-panel interview.  
Preparation for the panel meetings 
As discussed in the analysis section of this report, the panelists didn’t agree in 
their assessments of most of the indicators.  Recognizing that a one-day panel meeting 
would be insufficient for discussing all of these indicators, the research team reviewed 
the ratings and categorized each indicator in terms of whether there was low, medium, or 
high agreement among the panelists.  The panel discussion of the individual indicators 
was then structured to give priority to those indicators for which there was the most 
disagreement in the independent ratings.  As noted in the analysis section below, the 
extent of pre-meeting agreement on indicators varied among the panels.  For example, the 
discussion in the panel for Country A had few indicators on which there was agreement 
in the independent assessments.  Their discussion of indicators was completely taken up 
with those for which there was “low” initial agreement.  In contrast, the discussion for the 
Country C panel, with fewer indicators with low agreement, also was able to discuss 
indicators with “medium” initial agreement among the panelists. 
Panelists’ comments in their ratings and in the pre-meeting telephone interviews 
also were used to structure the panel discussion.  For example, as discussed later in this 
report, some of the indicators do not fit within the matrix framework.  In such cases, low 
agreement typically reflected differences in how individual panelists dealt with this 
anomaly in using the matrix framework rather than differences in their assessment of a 
country’s compliance.  These indicators were discussed as a group at the beginning of the 
session rather than taken up individually.   
The research team generated printouts for the panel members of their own ratings 
and comments for their use in the meeting.  Panel members were not given the ratings of 
the others on their panel.   
Panel meetings 
All three panel meetings took place at the University of Michigan and followed a 
similar format.   The individual panelists arrived in the afternoon before the main meeting 
day.  At a dinner meeting that evening, the panelists were provided with an agenda for the 
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following day (see Appendix E).  As noted above, each panelist was also provided a 
printout of his/her own assessments and comments compiled from the online database.  
This initial dinner meeting provided an orientation to the work of the following day.  It 
also served as a “get acquainted” session for the panelists.  The identities of the panel 
members had been purposefully withheld prior to the meeting to avoid any potential 
impact on the individual assessments.  For the most part, the panelists did not know each 
other, although in a few cases they had crossed paths in the past or knew of each other.  
During the main meeting, on the following day, the panel discussed their 
individual assessments of the indicators as well as the use of the matrix framework and 
WebMILS.  As described above, the discussion of individual indicators at the meeting 
was structured to focus on those for which there was less agreement among the panelists.   
Following the discussion of each of the indicators for which there was lower 
initial agreement, the panelists were asked to re-rate the indicator in light of the 
discussion.  These re-assessments were collected at the end of the session.  In the 
discussion, panelists often revealed how their assessment changed based on the issues 
raised by others, but their written re-assessments were not shared with the panel. 
Most of the meeting time was devoted to discussion of the individual indicators, 
along with more general points related to the matrix framework, WebMILS, and the 
availability and quality of information for making assessments.  Toward the end of the 
session, the panelists were asked to try to reach a consensus on an overall level of 
compliance for the three broad groups of indicators:  legal framework, government 
performance, and outcomes.  Although this step was not a part of the process outlined in 
the NAS report, it was undertaken to explore issues involved in moving from a discussion 
of individual indicators to a broader assessment of compliance in a country. 
Following the meeting, another telephone interview was conducted with each of 
the panelists to de-brief about the session.  The post-panel interview questions are 
presented in Appendix F. 
The analysis presented in this report is based on the individual assessments by the 
panel members, the interviews and other communications with the individual panelists, 
and the experience of the panel meetings.  The research team took notes during the 
interviews and panel meetings.  These were also audio-recorded.  These recordings were 
subsequently reviewed to ensure that the major points were captured for the analysis.  
Atlas.ti, a qualitative software program, was used for coding the content of the interviews 
and discussions and to support analysis for this report. 
 9
ANALYSIS/FINDINGS 
The findings from this evaluation are organized into sections addressing:  the 
process used by individual panelists to assess the indicators; agreement/disagreement on 
those assessments; the nature of the indicators themselves; WebMILS as a resource in 
making assessments; and the panel process itself.  These analyses draw upon data from 
all three panels.  It also may be of interest to look at the individual panels and how they 
functioned.  Appendix G includes a narrative overview of each of the individual panel 
discussions.  This provides a summary of the session as well as identifying some of the 
key points identified at the time of the panel session. 
ASSESSMENT PROCESS BY THE INDIVIDUAL PANELISTS 
The panelists brought different backgrounds to the assessment task.  Some had 
extensive experience with ILO conventions and researching those sources.  For others, 
information about many of the individual indicators was unfamiliar.  Some of these 
differences among panelists impacted both the processes that were followed in making 
the assessments and their willingness to make assessments when faced with ambiguous or 
missing data.  
Using WebMILS for analysis: batch versus iteration  
Panelists were encouraged to use WebMILS as the primary source of information, 
but were given little specific direction on how to approach the assessment task.  Based on 
their reports, there were two general patterns of how they used WebMILS in assessing 
the indicators.  Some went directly to the source materials, searched for information 
related to the country in question, and then printed that material (or stored it 
electronically).  Once this “batch” search phase was completed, they used that material as 
the basis for their assessment rather than returning to WebMILS.  The other pattern was 
more iterative:  panelists went through the indicators one at a time, going back and forth 
to the WebMILS source material for each indicator.  
Both of these approaches had strengths and weaknesses.  The iterative approach 
led to some inefficiencies because a panelist would have to return to the same source for 
subsequent indicators.  As one panelist remarked: 
What I did find was that there seemed to be a fair amount of overlap and 
redundancy, and especially in terms of doing the assessments of Freedom 
of Association.  I found that to be annoying.  It just seemed like I just 
answered this and now I have to do it again… go back to where I was 
before and copy the same stuff and bring it up here.5
                                                 
5 The panelists’ comments presented in this report are drawn from the notes the researchers made in the 
course of reviewing the recorded interviews and panel meetings.  They were not made by a professional 
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Most panelists appeared to use some combination of these approaches—printing out 
some key sources, but also doing some searches on an indicator-by-indicator basis.  One 
panelist, in looking back on the panel discussion, described it this way: 
We all used different strategies based on our individual work styles.  My 
first attempt was to go one by one and poke around.  At some point I said I 
should just be reading the source material first and get familiar with those 
because they all relate to each other and it will be more efficient.  It took 
me hours to come to that understanding.  That was a learning curve for 
me.  I did not know whether each indicator would command discrete 
answers from discrete sources.  I did not understand the overlapping and 
complementary nature of the sources. 
Another panelist expressed a similar view of the process: 
With all of us, our approaches evolved.  [Panelist a] did a little bit of what 
I did, which is to go real deep into the indicators, then looking at the data, 
then thinking “hey, this is not the best way to do this.” then stepping back 
out of it, checking the body of information and then going through it.  I 
went through the MILS data sources; I collected them and did not really 
delve into them.  After I collected them, I went through the indicators, and 
then I went deeper to see if I could specifically answer the indicators, and 
if not, I looked for most of the alternative sources. 
This description suggests that one weakness of only using the “batch” approach may be a 
greater tendency to not return to WebMILS or seek additional sources when the 
originally collected material did not have relevant information for an indicator. 
Non-assessment of indicators 
Most panelists did not assess some of the indicators.  Usually non-assessment 
occurred when a panelist felt that there was insufficient information to make an 
assessment.  Non-assessments also occurred when a panelist felt that the response options 
were not appropriate.  For example, as described in the section below on individual 
indicators, whether a country has ratified an ILO convention is a “yes-no” question.  If 
the country had ratified the convention, some panelists chose to use “some problems,” as 
the most positive response, while others left it blank, feeling that “some problems” 
wasn’t accurate.  A similar problem occurred when a panelist felt that there were no 
compliance problems, which is not one of the possible responses in the current matrix 
formulation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
transcription service and, while true to the content of the statements, they may not have the verbatim 
quality associated with professional transcriptions.  
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PATTERNS OF AGREEMENT/DISAGREEMENT 
Appendix H displays the panelists’ assessments of the indicators in matrix form 
for the three countries.  This parallels the format provided in the example provided on pp. 
30-31 of Monitoring International Labor Standards.  That hypothetical example 
compares the assessments of two raters, using bold-face type to highlight the six 
indicators (of thirty) for which there are differences in the ratings.  But the matrix display 
of ratings in Appendix H is difficult to scan to identify instances of agreement or 
disagreement on individual indicators.  This difficulty arises from the fact that in the pilot 
test, the ratings of three panelists are displayed rather than two.  It also reflects the fact 
that in the pilot test there were far more instances in which the three raters disagreed than 
in the hypothetical example.  For the purposes of this analysis, patterns of agreement or 
disagreement in the assessment of the indicators are examined in terms of the whole 
panel and by comparing pairs of panelists.  We first look at agreement among each panel 
as a whole. 
Agreement on ratings by all members of a panel 
From the perspective of each panel as a whole, we can examine how often the 
panelists all agreed in their initial assessments.  In practice, non-assessments reduce the 
number of indicators for which there could be agreement among all three panelists.  This 
is particularly striking for the panels for Country A and Country B.  The extent of non-
responses is displayed in table 1.   
For Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, Panel A and Panel B had 
a high incidence of indicators with non-assessments: 50.0 percent (19 indicators) and 
68.4 percent (26 indicators), respectively, of the indicators had at least one non-
assessment.  This high proportion of indicators with a least one non-assessment is largely 
the result of one panelist on each of those panels who had a particularly large number of 
non-assessments.  That same pattern of non-assessment is even more pronounced with 
regard to the second labor standard these panels addressed:  Acceptable Conditions of 
Work (Panel A) and Forced or Compulsory Labor (Panel B).   
Looking at agreement by all three members of each panel, we see in table 1 that 
relatively few indicators were assessed in the same way by all panelists.  For example, 
Panel C, with fewer non-assessments than the other panels, had only thirteen Freedom of 
Association indicators for which all members rated level of compliance the same way.  
That represents 34.2 percent of the thirty-eight indicators or 39.4 percent of those 
indicators that did not have any non-assessments.  Agreement on indicators of 
Discrimination, the second labor standard addressed by Panel C, was also relatively high:  
44.4 percent of indicators that had no non-assessments. 
The figures in table 1 show more agreement on direction of change than on level 
of compliance.  This may reflect differences in these two types of assessments. 
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Table 1 
Initial Agreement on Assessment of Indicators by Individual Panelists 
 
a. Indicators with at least one non-assessment 
 
  Freedom of Association Acceptable Forced or  
 and Collective Bargaining Conditions of Work Compulsory Labor Discrimination 
 n=38 indicators n=37 indicators n=16 indicators n=31 indicators 
 Panel A           Panel B            Panel C     Panel A Panel B Panel C 
 n         Pct.        n        Pct.        n         Pct.       n         Pct. n            Pct. n           Pct. 
   19      50.0%     26     68.4%     5        13.2%              30       81.1%         13          81.3%   13         41.9% 
 
 
b. Indicators with initial agreement among all panelists 
 
 Freedom of Association        Acceptable Forced or  
 and Collective Bargaining       Conditions of Work Compulsory Labor Discrimination 
 n=38 indicators        n=37 indicators n=16 indicators n=31 indicators 
    Level of Compliance: 
 Panel A           Panel B            Panel C Panel A Panel B Panel C 
 n         Pct.        n        Pct.        n         Pct.   n         Pct. n            Pct. n           Pct. 
 2        5.3%       6      15.8%     13      34.2%           1         2.7%          0            0.0%    8          25.8% 
            Excluding indicators with at least one non-assessment:     
                   10.5%        50.0%         39.4%                14.3%                        0.0%                      44.4% 
 
    Direction of Change: 
 Panel A           Panel B            Panel C Panel A Panel B Panel C 
 n         Pct.        n        Pct.        n         Pct.   n         Pct. n            Pct. n           Pct. 
 9       23.7%     12     31.6%     28      73.7%           5        13.5%          3          18.8%   11         35.5% 
            Excluding indicators with at least one non-assessment:     
                   47.4%     100.0%        84.8%               71.4%                     100.0%                      61.1% 
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Compared to level of compliance, there was much less overall variation (i.e., higher 
agreement) in the assessments of direction of change.  This can be seen in table 2, in 
which the distribution of the ratings given by all panelists is displayed.  For “level of 
compliance,” “some problems” was the modal rating, but an assessment of “more 
extensive problems” was seen almost as frequently.  The panelists characterized the level 
of compliance as “severe” less often, but, still, it accounted for 20.4 percent of the 
assessments.  In contrast, there was much less variation in the ratings of direction of 
change.  “Steady state” was selected 81.6 percent of the time.  Compliance was 
characterized as “improving” in 12.7 percent of the assessments and “worsening” only 
twenty-eight times, 5.7 percent of the assessments.  The dominance of “steady state” may 
reflect a reality that at most points in time the level of compliance is not changing 
significantly.  It may also suggest that “steady state” tends to function as a default 
category in the absence of any clear indication of direction of change. 
Pair-wise agreement among panelists 
Returning to level of compliance, we can consider agreement between pairs of 
panelists.  In contrast to agreement among all members of the 3-person panels, comparing 
pairs of assessors provides another view of how much agreement and disagreement 
existed within the panels.  It also has the advantage of including more points of 
comparison because an instance of non-assessment by one panelist does not limit 
comparing the ratings of the other two.  Table 3 presents the pair-wise agreement on level 
of compliance for the three panels:  panelists a and b (a:b); panelists a and c (a:c), and 
panelists b and c (b:c).  For each panel, the number of indicators rated by each pair is 
shown, along with the number of times the pair were in agreement, and “agreed 
indicators” as a percentage of the ratings that the pair of panelists had in common (that is, 
when they both rated an indicator).  As noted above, non-assessments diminish the 
number of indicators for which there is the possibility of agreement.  As was the case for 
panel-wide discussion, non-assessments are a major factor for Panel B and, to a lesser 
extent, for Panel A.   
In general, pairs of panelists tended to agree between about 30 percent to nearly 
70 percent of the time.  This is considerably lower than the 80 percent agreement in the 
hypothetical matrix example presented in Monitoring International Labor Standards.  
For Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, the labor standard addressed by 
all three panels, Panel A had lower levels of agreement (31.6 percent to 36.4 percent); the 
range of pair-wise agreement was higher for Panel B (52.6 percent to 66.7 percent) and 
Panel C (52.9 percent to 58.8 percent).  
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Table 2 
Distribution of Ratings for Level of Compliance and Direction of Change 
 
 
Level of Compliance 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C Three Panels  
Some problems 76 47.8% 61 49.2% 74 39.4% 211 44.8% 
More extensive  problems 40 25.2% 45 36.3% 79 42.0% 164 34.8% 
Severe 43 27.0% 18 14.5% 35 18.6% 96 20.4% 
 
 
Direction of Change 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C Three Panels  
Steady state 134 80.7% 102 73.9% 164 88.2% 400 81.6% 
Improving 13 7.8% 35 25.4% 14 7.5% 62 12.7% 





Pair-Wise Agreement among Panelists—Level of Compliance 
 
Freedom of Association 
                                          n=38 indicators 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
        Pairings of panelists a:b          a:c           b:c  a:b          a:c         b:c    a:b         a:c           b:c 
Number of indicators 
assessed in common    19           26           22    38           12          12       34           38           34 
Number of agreements     6             9             8    20             7            8        20           21           18  
Percent agreement 31.6%      34.6%     36.4% 52.6%     58.3%     66.7% 58.8%     55.3%      52.9% 
 
 
 Acceptable Conditions of Work Forced or Compulsory Labor Discrimination 
                 n=37 indicators                   n=16 indicators                                      n=31 indicators 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C
Percent agreement 28.6%     58.3%     36.4% 37.5%       0.0%      75.0% 45.0%      61.9%     50.9% 
Number of agreements     2           14            4     6             0             3         9            13           13  
 
        Pairings of panelists a:b          a:c         b:c  a:b          a:c         b:c    a:b         a:c           b:c 
Number of indicators 
assessed in common     7           24           11    16            4             4       20           21           26 
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Agreement between a pair of raters can also be characterized using Cohen’s 
kappa, a statistical measure developed to quantify the level of agreement between raters 
(“inter-rater reliability”) taking into account chance agreements.  Values for kappa 
generally range from “0,” indicating no more agreement than would have been expected 
by chance, to “1,” indicating complete agreement.  Scores of 0.400 or higher tend to be 
interpreted as indicating moderate agreement between pairs of raters.  Negative kappa 
values can occur and generally are interpreted to indicate less agreement than would be 
expected by chance.   
Kappa values were calculated for each pairing of panelists (see table 4).  For this 
analysis, separate kappas were calculated for the assessments of level of compliance and 
direction of change.  As noted in the table, kappas are not displayed in three cases where 
there are a very small number of assessments that can be compared (because of a high 
number of non-assessments).  In two other instances, kappas could not be calculated 
because there was no variance in the ratings—all of the ratings of direction of change 
were “steady state.”   
The kappas presented in Table 4 provide another indication of the low level of 
agreement between panelists in their individual, pre-meeting assessments.  None of the 
kappas for level of compliance were above 0.400 and only two were above that for 
direction of change. 
Agreement and disagreement on assessments in context 
The level of agreement—or lack of agreement—in the assessments by individual 
panelists for each of the three countries is not surprising, given the nature of the 
assessment task.  Consistency among raters can be thought of as a function of (1) the 
clarity of the task, (2) the uniformity of available information, and (3) the extent to which 
criteria for ratings are operationalized.  In terms of the clarity of the task, the indicators 
are intended to represent discrete considerations that can inform a broader assessment of 
the relevant labor standard.  But many, if not most, of the individual indicators are 
themselves complex and subject to interpretation, as discussed more specifically in the 
next section of this report.  
On the second point—uniformity of the information used for the assessments—
the panelists all used WebMILS for relevant information, but they frequently referenced 




Inter-Rater Reliability—Cohen’s kappas for the  
Pair-Wise Agreement among Panelists* 
 
 Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
Pairings of panelists a:b          a:c           b:c  a:b          a:c           b:c    a:b         a:c           b:c 
 
Level of Compliance   -0.075    -0.009      0.055    0.257        0.127      0.254     0.361     0.244       0.237 
 
Direction of Change   -0.070     -0.033      0.135    0.386        0.213       0.121    [no var.]   [no var.]     0.096 
 
 
 Acceptable Conditions Forced or Compulsory  
 of Work Labor Discrimination 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
Pairings of panelists a:b          a:c           b:c  a:b          a:c           b:c    a:b         a:c           b:c 
 
Level of Compliance   -0.111      0.273      0.167   -0.226      -0.231     [<5 cells]     0.082     0.111      -0.157 
 
Direction of Change     0.633     0.191      0.077    0.244      [<5 cells]    [<5 cells]     0.010     0.121       0.428 
 
* The paired assessments used for calculating these kappas excluded the few indicators that suggested a “yes-no” response because 




Perhaps the greatest source of variation arises from the operationalization of 
levels of compliance.  As discussed in the introduction to this report, Monitoring 
International Labor Standards provides a conceptual distinction between the ratings that 
relies on the discretionary judgments of the individual panelist:  
In general, ‘some problems’ with compliance are those that are not so frequent, 
broad, or severe as to seriously undermine compliance with a given standard.  
‘Severe problems’ are such as to make compliance difficult or impossible.  We 
expect, however, that many indicators for many countries will fall into the middle 
category:  problems that are serious enough to raise questions about compliance in 
important areas or for particular groups, but not across the board.  (p. 28) 
Given the complexity of the indicators, inconsistency and missing information in reports 
or other substantiating material, and the extent of discretionary judgments involved, it is 
not surprising that expert assessors reach different conclusions. 
Discussion in the panel meetings provided numerous examples of differences 
arising from each of these factors.  The easiest to resolve were those in which panelists 
based their assessments on different information.  It was not unusual in the panel 
meetings for panelists to remark they had not seen a particular report that someone else 
had found helpful and, in light of that additional information, they would modify their 
assessment.  It was also common for panelists to acquiesce to changing their assessment 
when they felt it was a borderline situation, saying something like:  “I rated it as some 
problems, but I could live with more extensive problems.” 
Other sources of differences in assessments were less likely to be resolved in 
discussion.  In some cases, there were distinct differences in the interpretation of an 
indicator.  For example, discussion of the legal framework indicators raised differences in 
whether panelists should consider how the law operates in practice or only the “letter of 
the law.”  This issue is discussed with regard to the individual indicators in the following 
section.  Another recurring question was whether compliance within a country should be 
assessed compared to the ideal standard or to the situation in other, similarly-situated 
countries.  It was not unusual for one panelist to characterize a compliance problem in 
country X as severe and for another panelist to respond that it was a lot better than in 
countries Y and Z.   
The individual orientation of panelists is another potential source of disagreement.  
In the course of the panel discussions and the post-panel interviews, the issue was raised 
of how the personal views of panelists toward labor rights, the role of government, etc., 
impact their assessments.  As one panelist put it: 
… it is still a judgment call.  There are not strict criteria.   What 
constitutes level of compliance will depend on where someone is coming 
from in terms of approach, point of view, moral commitment, political 
commitment. 
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Analysis of the ratings did not reveal systematic differences in how individual panelists 
rated level of compliance.  The distribution of these ratings for each panelist for all of the 
indicators that they assessed is shown in table 5.  Differences in the backgrounds of the 
raters do not appear to be associated with systematic differences in how they rated 
compliance.  For example, one of the panelists working with a union group characterized 
problems as “severe” more frequently than the others on the panel, but the other union-
based expert used “severe” less often than the others on his panel.  On a panel-wide basis, 
those assessing Country A characterized compliance problems as “severe” somewhat 
more often than Panels B and C.  It is not clear whether this represents differences in the 
countries themselves or in the orientations of the panelists.   
Another aspect of the orientation of individuals is how confident they were in 
their assessments.  Table 6 shows the distribution of how the panelists characterized their 
confidence in their assessment of each indicator.  The table also includes an average 
confidence score (“low confidence” = 1; “moderate confidence” = 2; and “confident” = 
3).  The average “level of confidence” ranged from a low of 1.75 (between low 
confidence and moderate confidence) to a high of 2.74 (“confident” most of the time).  In 
the course of panel discussions about different ratings, panelists frequently conditioned 
their remarks by referring to their level of confidence.  For example, one panelist 
described his willingness to change his rating this way: 
Absent harder data, I did not think it was fair to say the problems were 
severe.  I also said I had low confidence; my conclusion was highly 
speculative.  I said “some problems,” steady state.  I did not see the 
Transparency International report.  That might have bumped up my level 
of compliance. 
Reassessing selected indicators  
As described in the “Methods” section, the discussion of individual 
indicators in the panelist meetings focused on those indicators for which there was 
less agreement in the individual ratings.  After discussing an indicator, the 
panelists were asked to reassess the level of compliance.  At the end of the 
session, these reassessments were collected.  The reassessments, along with the 
panelists’ initial rating and their confidence level with that initial assessment, are 
displayed in Appendix I.   
The indicators in Appendix I do not precisely correspond to those 
indicators that had low initial agreement.  For example, depending upon the 
content of the discussion, some low-agreement indicators that were discussed 
were not reassessed by the panelists.  Also, some indicators which did not have 
low initial agreement were discussed by the group and, based on that discussion, 
panelists reassessed them.   
The opportunity for reassessing the ratings led to greater agreement on 
some of the indicators, but not others.  In order to assess the extent to which the 
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Table 5 
Ratings of Level of Compliance by Panelists 
 Panel A 
 Panelist  a Panelist  b Panelist  c 
 Industrial relations Law Union-based 
 professor professor analyst 
Ratings n n n  
 Some Problems 22 43.1%* 16 48.5% 38 50.7% 
 More Extensive Problems 14 27.5%   4 12.1% 22 29.3% 
 Severe Problems 15 29.4% 13 39.4% 15 20.0% 
 
 Panel B  
 Panelist  a Panelist  b Panelist  c 
 Ind’t consultant Ind’t consultant ILO expert 
 (business) (NGO, gov’t) (labor  rights) 
 
Ratings n n n  
 Some Problems 22 40.7% 28 51.9% 11 68.8% 
 More Extensive Problems 23 42.6% 18 33.3% 4 25.0% 
 Severe Problems 9 16.7%   8 14.8% 1 6.3% 
 
 Panel C 
 Panelist  a Panelist  b Panelist  c 
 Business/law Union-based Ind’t consultant 
 professor official  (NGO, gov’t) 
Ratings n n n  
 Some Problems 32 54.2% 17 28.3% 25 36.2% 
 More Extensive Problems 21 35.6% 28 46.7% 30 43.5% 
 Severe Problems 6 10.2% 15 25.0% 14 20.3% 
 
 
*The percentages represent how often a panelist rated level of compliance as “some 





Panelists’ Confidence in their Assessments  
 Panel A 
 Panelist a Panelist b Panelist c 
Freedom of Association 
Low Confidence 3 9.7% 0 0.0% 1 2.6% 
Moderate Confidence 20 64.5% 19 61.3% 8 21.1% 
Confident 8 25.8% 12 38.7% 29 76.3% 
Average confidence* 2.16 2.39 2.74 
Acceptable Conditions of Work 
Low Confidence 4 14.8% 1 3.4% 4 11.1% 
Moderate Confidence 3 11.1% 10 34.5% 9 25.0% 
Confident 20 74.1% 18 62.1% 23 63.9% 
Average confidence 2.59 2.59 2.53 
 Panel B  
 Panelist a Panelist b Panelist c 
Freedom of Association 
Low Confidence 12 32.4% 2 5.6% 3 12.5% 
Moderate Confidence 13 35.1% 19 52.8% 6 25.0% 
Confident 12 32.4% 15 41.7% 15 62.5% 
Average confidence 2.00 2.36 2.50 
Forced or Compulsory Labor 
Low Confidence 9 56.3% 4 25.0% 0 0.0% 
Moderate Confidence 2 12.5% 8 50.0% 3 42.9% 
Confident 5 31.3% 4 25.0% 4 57.1% 
Average confidence 1.75 2.00 2.57 
 Panel C 
 Panelist a Panelist b Panelist c 
Freedom of Association 
Low Confidence 5 13.2% 12 31.6% 6 15.8% 
Moderate Confidence 15 39.5% 13 34.2% 14 36.8% 
Confident 18 47.4% 13 34.2% 18 47.4% 
Average confidence 2.34 2.03 2.32 
Discrimination 
Low Confidence 0 0.0% 1 4.0% 8 25.8% 
Moderate Confidence 11 52.4% 16 64.0% 10 32.3% 
Confident 10 47.6% 8 32.0% 13 41.9% 
Average confidence 2.48 2.28 2.16 
* Levels of confidence:  1= low confidence; 2 = moderate confidence; 3 = confident 
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discussion produced greater concurrence among the panelists, the researchers 
created a difference index as a measure of agreement based on the differences 
between the three pairs of ratings.  Assigning a numeric value corresponding to 
the rank order of the responses (“some problems” = 1; “more extensive problems” 
= 2; “severe problems” = 3), the sum of the absolute values of the differences 
between the ratings of the three panelists could be calculated.  For example, if an 
indicator had the following assessments by the three panelists: 
 Rating Numeric value 
Panelist a “some problems” 1 
Panelist b “severe problems” 3 
Panelist c “more extensive problems  2 
The difference index for indicator #1 would be 4: 
Panelist a – Panelist b 1  –  3   =   -2  
Panelist a – Panelist c 1  –  2   =   -1  
Panelist b – Panelist c 3  –  2   =    1  
         difference index |-2| +|-1| + |1|    =    4 
In this hypothetical example, the various ratings by the three panelists results in a 
difference index of 4. 
A cumulative difference index was calculated for Panels A and C to see the extent 
to which discussion among the panelists reduced the differences in their individual 
assessments of level of compliance.  (A cumulative difference index is not presented for 
Panel B because the incidence of initial non-assessments renders the measure less useful.)  
The reduction in the cumulative difference index for Panels A and C are displayed in 
table 7.  For both panels, there was less disagreement after discussion, although the size 
of the reduction was greater for Panel A than Panel C.  Partially this reflects the larger 
pre-discussion differences between the ratings, with Panel A having a larger initial 
cumulative difference index with a smaller number of indicators.  From a more 
impressionistic point of view, the discussion by Panel C also seemed to have more areas 
of substantive disagreement on interpretation of indicators (e.g., whether assessing the 




Change in Level of Agreement after Discussion 
 Panel A Panel C 
Number of indicators reassessed 10 16 
   (excluding those with non-responses) 
Total difference index  
before discussion 36 34 
after discussion 26 28 
Reduction in difference index 10 6 
Percent reduction -27.8% -17.6% 
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Moving to overall assessments 
The NAS-ILAB matrix methodology doesn’t provide directions for how to move 
from the assessment of individual indicators to more general conclusions for a country.  
As a step in this direction for the evaluation, panelists were asked for an overall rating of 
the level of compliance for each labor standard for the three broad areas:  legal 
framework; government performance; and outcomes.  This task was introduced toward 
the end of Panel A’s discussion in order to simulate what would be the next logical step 
in making an assessment of the country as a whole.  The discussion among the panelists 
provides an indication of some of the complications of moving from individual indicators 
to an overall assessment.  For example, panelists noted that a simple summation of the 
ratings could be misleading because some indicators were more important than others in 
their impact on the status of labor rights in a country.  The issue of moving from 
individual indicators to a broader characterization of compliance in a country is discussed 
later this report.   
Another issue that arose was the potential consequences of the overall ratings.  
Panelists noted that although they might be willing to make assessments under conditions 
of uncertainty in the context of an evaluation, they would be hesitant to venture such 
judgments if those ratings meant serious economic sanctions on a poor country. 
The discussion about overall assessment re-visited issues that arose about 
individual indicators, such as incomplete or missing data and whether assessing 
compliance should compare conditions to those in other countries or to ideal standards.  
This latter point was most strongly expressed in Panel A, the first panel to have its 
meeting.  Panel A only proceeded as far as an overall assessment of the legal framework 
for Freedom of Association.  Panelists were split between characterizing it as having 
“more extensive” or “severe” problems.  After much discussion, they reached a “reluctant 
consensus” on rating it as having “more extensive” problems.  However, one panelist 
continued to argue that, according to the criteria in Monitoring International Labor 
Standards, there were severe problems.  
Based on the experience in the first panel, the task of making an overall panel 
assessment for the country was described to the panelists earlier in the process (although 
the actual task still was undertaken towards the end of the session).  More complete 
overall assessments were reached for countries B and C, although these also were often 
“reluctant” agreements in the face of differing interpretations and lack of solid evidence.  
Table 8 displays the overall assessments for countries B and C. 
For both country assessments, panelists struggled with what they considered borderline 
determinations, such as whether the overall performance with regard to Forced or 
Compulsory Labor reflected “more extensive” or “severe” problems in Country B or the 
legal framework of Country C had “some” problems of compliance or these problems 
were “more extensive.”  Typically, the discussion would involve one of the three 
panelists acquiescing to the views of the other two.  The direction of change for Freedom 
of Association in Country C reflects a movement toward greater democracy ten years 
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earlier.  The level of compliance is characterized as improving if compared with 
conditions over a ten-year period, but there appears to have been little change in the last 
five years.  
In the course of seeking agreement—and in some of the earlier discussions—
panelists raised the option of having more gradations in the ratings, such as a 5-point 
scale rather than the 3-point ratings of some, more extensive, and severe problems.  This 
is reflected in table 8, when the agreement is reported as “bordering on…,” which 
reflected a middle ground as a compromise between levels in order to reach consensus.  
Although some panelists felt that having more gradations available in the response set 
would be helpful, there was no general agreement that that a 5-point scale would be an 
improvement over the 3-point scale used in the current formulation.  
Reaching (or not reaching) a consensus 
In the course of the meetings, panelists were asked to try to reach a consensus in 
two areas:  the assessment of individual indicators and overall conclusions with regard to 
the legal framework, government performance, and overall outcomes in a country.  With 
regard to individual indicators, differences in initial assessments arose from differences in 
interpretation of the indicators, the equivocal nature of data available, and the open-ended 
nature of the criteria for assigning categories.  In the course of trying to seek consensus 
on indicators, panel members seemed most willing to change their assessments when they 
felt that new information was presented.  For example, one panelist may have based his 
or her assessment on a report that another panelist had not seen.6  There were also 
situations where particular expertise, such as experience in the country or specific 
knowledge of the law, led a panelist to acquiesce to changing an assessment in order to 
achieve consensus.  
On the other hand, it appears that some aspects of the process worked against 
reaching a consensus on individual indicators.  The fact that each panelist independently 
assessed the indicators prior to the group meeting created some level of “vested interest” 
in their individual ratings.  In the absence of new information, revising one’s assessment 
was a tacit statement that an assessment was not correct.  This didn’t appear to be a factor 
initially, but a “micro-history” developed within each panel as discussion proceeded.  If a 
panelist felt that he or she were more often than others in the position of changing an 
assessment to reach consensus, there seemed to be a growing reluctance to do so.  
Previous decisions to change a rating appeared to reduce that individual’s willingness to 
change additional ratings.  This dynamic was intensified in the Panel C meeting, when 
the researchers varied the protocol by asking the panel to publicly reach a consensus on 
individual indicators rather than only having the panelists re-rate privately (i.e., in 
writing).  As described earlier, this attempt at reaching a public consensus on individual
                                                 
6 In some instances when a panel member brought up information obtained outside of WebMILS (e.g., a 
report an NGO or a personal communication from a State Department source), other panelists remarked 
that they found it difficult to integrate this new information “on the fly.”  Some panelists also noted that the 
use of such outside sources was outside of the research protocol and they were unclear how it should be 
used in the context of the evaluation. 
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Table 8 
Overall Assessments for Panels B and C 
 
 Panel B:  Freedom of Association 
 Level of Compliance Direction of Change 
 Legal Framework: Some problems Improving 
 Government More extensive  Steady state 
 Performance: Problems (but corruption continuing  
   as a serious problem) 
 Overall performance: More extensive Steady state 
  Problems 
 
 Panel B:  Forced or Compulsory Labor 
 Level of Compliance Direction of Change 
 Legal Framework: Some problems Steady state 
 Government More extensive  Improving 
 Performance: Problems  
 Overall performance: More extensive Steady state 
  Problems (little information; forced labor 
  (bordering on “severe”) improving somewhat because  
   of political pressure;  
   child prostitution common) 
*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *  
 Panel C:  Freedom of Association 
 Level of Compliance Direction of Change 
 Legal Framework: Some problems Improving 
  (bordering on “more extensive”) (over last 10 yrs;  
   “steady state” in last 5 years 
 Government More extensive  Improving 
 Performance: Problems (over last 10 yrs;  
  (bordering on “severe”) “steady state” in last 5 years 
 Overall performance: (no rating) (no rating) 
 
 Panel C:  Discrimination 
 Level of Compliance Direction of Change 
 Legal Framework: Some problems Steady state 
  (bordering on “more extensive”) 
 Government More extensive  Steady state 
 Performance: Problems  
 Overall performance: (no rating) (no rating) 
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indicators was quickly abandoned when the panel discussion of the first few indicators 
proved very time-consuming and seemed to be beginning to engender some degree of 
defensiveness and hostility within the group.   
The dynamics of seeking a consensus on a more general assessment of the legal 
framework, government performance, and outcomes were somewhat different than those 
for the individual indicators.  First, the panelists hadn’t already made such an assessment, 
so there was no question of having to revise a previous assessment.  Second, the task was 
more integrative and called for the participants to step back from the specifics to try to 
categorize the “big picture.”  It was in this context that the question of priorities among 
the indicators was raised.  Also, when asked to step back from specific indicators and 
consider an overall rating, some panelists remarked that the consequences of such an 
assessment would be a factor in their judgments.  As noted above, some panelists said 
they would be reluctant to venture an assessment—particularly under conditions of 
uncertainty—that might cut a poor country off from the benefits of a desired trade 
relationship. 
Another aspect of the consensus that was reached with regard to an overall 
assessment of compliance was the fact that in some instances the agreement was on a 
middle ground between assessments (e.g., in table 8, “more extensive problems bordering 
on ‘severe’”).  Creating this kind of “in-between” assessment facilitated coming to a 
consensus in a way that hadn’t been treated as an option when the panel discussed 
individual indicators.  
CHALLENGES IN ASSESSING THE INDICATORS 
The panelists identified a number of issues arising from their efforts to assess the 
indicators.  An over-riding issue is the underlying problems of missing and skewed 
information in the national sources.  This issue, which is also highlighted in Monitoring 
International Labor Standards, was raised by all of the panels.  Self-censorship and 
political/economic motives are sources of potential distortion in government information 
sources.   
Another major problem arises from the fact that official statistics often do not 
address the “informal” economy, which can account for most employment in developing 
countries.  In Country A, for example, a panelist characterized five different employment 
situations that impact the extent to which workers are “visible” in national statistics: 
 
(1) Regular employees who are registered and covered by social security 
(2) Regular employees who are not registered 
(3) Informal employees who do not receive regular pay 
(4) Temporary employees and employees of third-party service companies 
(5) Agricultural workers/small farmers. 
Often, only the first category of workers is included for official statistics and reports. 
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A picture of the situation in a country may also be skewed by the differential 
attention received by certain industries.  Some export industries, such as apparel and toys, 
have received more attention than others from NGOs.  While conditions in those 
industries may be representative of conditions elsewhere, this may not be the case.  This 
raises the related problem of how to extrapolate from anecdotal reports to a broader 
assessment of conditions in a country.   
In addition to these general problems related to assessment, a number of issues 
were identified with regard to individual indicators.  A listing of specific issues related to 
the indicators is included in Appendix J.  Most of these issues fall into one of several 
categories: operationalization of the levels of compliance; the time period for assessing 
“direction of change;” parameters for assessing “legal framework” indicators; answer-set 
problems; clarity of wording and/or intent; and relationship to recognized international 
standards 
Operationalization of the levels of compliance   
Questions were raised by panelists about the basis for assessing level of 
compliance.  As noted above, the distinction between the levels is based on how 
widespread and pervasive are the limits on compliance.  “Some problems” are situations 
in which violations are “not so frequent, broad, or severe as to seriously undermine 
compliance.”  “Severe problems” is to be used when violations make “compliance 
difficult or impossible.” (p. 28)  In Monitoring International Labor Standards, they also 
note, however, that assessments have to consider “the resources available to the 
government for compliance, the poverty of the country, the number of workplaces, and 
other demands for government resources” (p. 24).  Assessments of level of compliance, 
therefore, are to be tempered by recognition of the constraints facing a country.  In 
practice, panelists often implicitly or explicitly compared the country they were assessing 
with other similarly situated countries.  A panelist might say that there were serious 
problems with an indicator but they were not as bad as in a neighboring country.  On the 
other hand, a panelist looking at the same country might provide a lower assessment, 
focusing solely on the extent to which conditions fell short of the stated international 
standard. 
Time period for assessing “direction of change”   
All of the panels raised the question of what time frame should be used for 
assessing “direction of change.”  For example, two of the panelists for Country A used 
changes since 2000 as their basis; the third panelist only considered changes in the last 
two or three years.  As noted in the discussion of table 6 (above), an increase in 
democratic practices ten years ago in Country C led to improvements in compliance, but 
there have been no discernable improvements since then.  The time period for assessing 
direction of change in this situation would determine how it was characterized.  One 
panelist suggested that it might be appropriate to think in terms of the time it takes for a 
change in law to be proposed, adopted, and implemented—perhaps seven or eight years.  
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Parameters for assessing “legal framework” indicators   
Questions emerged concerning whether the way that a law is implemented should 
be a part of the assessment of the “legal framework” indicators.  Should assessors 
consider how the law has been applied or the outcome of court cases?   
The wording of some indicators clearly relates solely to what is written in law.  
For example, Acceptable Conditions of Work indicator A-2 is whether there are 
provisions in the “national constitution or law establishing one or more minimum 
wages.”  On the other hand, the wording of other legal framework indicators suggests 
more of an evaluation of the effectiveness of a legal provision.  Freedom of Association 
A-16, for instance, is “the extent to which the government can limit picketing or 
occupation of the workplace.”  To assess this indicator, one might have to look at 
practice, such as how laws related to public order are applied in the case of labor actions.  
Other legal framework indicators more explicitly call for considering how the law 
operates in practice.  For example, indicator A-9 under Discrimination is: 
whether there are laws that make nondiscrimination in employment 
meaningful in practice with equal access to education, training, 
vocational guidance, and placement services; maternity protection; 
and parental leave (emphasis added). 
Including “meaningful in practice” appears to direct the attention of the assessor beyond 
the letter of the law to how it operates in practice. 
Answer-set problems   
The matrix approach offers three responses for level of compliance:  some 
problems; more extensive problems, or severe problems.  For some of the indicators, this 
answer set is not appropriate.  First, there are situations in which there are “no problems,” 
but this is not one of the possible responses.  Second, some indicators call for a 
categorical (binary) response—“yes” or “no”—rather than a ranking.  For example, either 
a country has or has not ratified a particular ILO convention.  As mentioned with regard 
to indicators that were not assessed, panelists responded to this situation in different 
ways.  If the country in question had ratified the convention, one panelist might use 
“some problems” (as the most positive response) while another might leave it blank.   
A third answer-set problem involves “outcome” indicators, such as union density 
(Freedom of Association C-1) or strike activity (Freedom of Association C-2).  While 
these indicators are certainly related to union activity in a country, it is unclear how they 
are related to levels of compliance.  In fact, how these indicators should be interpreted is 
itself unclear.  Higher rates of union density may well be associated with greater freedom 
of association, but does a lower rate indicate problems of compliance in a country?  
Similarly, does greater strike activity suggest compliance problems or a powerful labor 
movement?   
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Clarity of wording and/or intent   
Panelists also raised questions about interpreting and assessing specific indicators.  
These are detailed in Appendix J.  While many of these comments are specific to a 
particular indicator, several recurring issues can be discerned.  One problem is an 
indicator that combines two or more issues—a so-called “double-barreled” question.  For 
example, indicator A-2 under Freedom of Association is:  “whether there are legal 
provisions that entitle workers or employers to establish and join organizations of their 
own choosing without previous authorization.”   Panelists noted that adding “without 
previous authorization” complicates the indicator and makes it difficult to assess.  Is the 
indicator asking whether workers are free to unionize or is it asking about the process by 
which a union is certified as legitimate?   
Freedom of Association A-15 provides another example of an indicator that 
combines several issues: 
the extent to which the government can forbid certain kinds of strikes (such as 
"protest strikes," "sympathy strikes," "go slow" strikes, or "work-to-rule" 
slowdown), or strikes under certain conditions (such as economic or political 
"crisis"), or strikes requiring a majority of workers involved to authorize a strike 
This indicator includes three different potential bases for rating the compliance of 
governments in their restrictions of strikes:  the type of strike; the political/economic 
context; and the process for strike authorization.   
Relationship to recognized international standards   
Questions were also raised about indicators that related to situations that are not 
covered by international labor standards.  When an indicator does not correspond to an 
international standard, it is unclear what is meant by “compliance.”  This issue was 
touched on earlier with regard to outcome indicators, such as union density, that are 
relevant to the context of a country but are not clearly translatable to a measure of level 
of compliance.  Indicator B-7 under Forced or Compulsory Labor provides another 
example.  It asks whether the country is receiving technical assistance.  Actively seeking 
technical assistance may be a useful indicator of a country’s intent to address problems of 
forced labor, but it is not an obligation under international codes and, therefore, not an 
issue of “compliance.”   
USING WEBMILS AS A SOURCE FOR ASSESSMENTS 
A major element of the NAS-ILAB project was “to construct a database for use in 
monitoring international labor standards.” (Monitoring International Labor Standards, p. 
16)  WebMILS was created as a structure and source for qualitative and quantitative data 
that could be used to assess current conditions in countries.  WebMILS contains key 
information from the Monitoring International Labor Standards volume, as well as links 
to data sources for assessing the indicators.   
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The structure of WebMILS is displayed in figure 3, below.7  From the home page 
(http://www.dol.gov/ilab/webmils/), one can go to information about the international 
labor standards and their associated indicators as well as issues associated with assessing 
compliance and the matrix as a tool in the assessment process.  This information draws 
upon relevant sections of Monitoring International Labor Standards.  For example, 
selecting “International Labor Standards” brings one to a narrative description from the 
book of each of the five labor standards.  “Assessing Compliance” allows the user to 
select a labor standard to see information about compliance with that standard, including 
the indicators developed for legal framework, government performance, and outcomes.  
This information pertains to international labor standards generally rather than to the 
situation of an individual country. 
To retrieve information for assessing conditions in a country, one selects “Search 
WebMILS” and picks the country of interest.  This brings the user to a page for that 
country, with a listing of the labor standards.8  Selecting a labor standard takes the user to 
a list of the indicators for that standard followed by sources of information from 
international bodies, national sources, U.S. government sources, nongovernmental 
bodies, and other research.  With the exception of the national sources, these sources are 
largely the same for all countries.9  For example, the link to an international site, such as 
the ILO’s Application of International Labour Standards (APPLIS) database, which 
documents ratifications of conventions, is the same for all countries.  Once users go to 
that external source, they use the search mechanism at that site to look for information 
relevant to the country in question.   
“National sources,” on the other hand, are specific to the country being 
researched.  Depending upon what is available in a country, WebMILS may provide links 
to a country’s ministry of labor, statistical office, description of national laws, and other 
relevant sites.  These websites may be in the national language of the country. 
The panelists used WebMILS as their principal source of information for the 
assessments, although, as noted, additional sources were also used.  In general, panelists 
felt that WebMILS was a useful tool for identifying data sources on the labor rights 
                                                 
7 Figure 3 includes the major elements of the version of WebMILS used during the evaluation.  Not 
displayed in the figure are options for viewing all of the sources of information included in WebMILS, 
frequently-asked questions, and providing feedback.  This report focuses on the aspects of WebMILS that 
were used in testing the ILAB-NAS matrix methodology.  There are some additional aspects of the 
WebMILS site that did not come into play in this exercise and appear to reflect other aspects of the 
Committee’s work.  For example, in addition to the indicators of legal framework (A), government 
performance (B), and overall outcomes (C), there are references to indicators for associated factors (D), 
human capital (E), and general country information (F).  Although these additional areas enter into the 
discussion in Monitoring International Labor Standards and on WebMILS, they are not formally integrated 
into the matrix assessment process. 
8 In addition to the four “core” labor standards and acceptable conditions of work, there is also the option to 
select “Human Capital,” because of its association with level of development and compliance with labor 
standards.  Unlike the five other areas, there are no indicators specified.  WebMILS does, however, provide 
sources for relevant background information. 
9 Some nongovernmental organizations and research reports are also specific to a country. 
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situation in a country.  They thought it would be particularly helpful for those who are 
not experienced researching international labor conditions.   
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The panelists identified a number of issues related to their use of WebMILS for 
the assessment exercise.  These included questions about the content of the system as 
well as its structure and functions.   
Content of WebMILS   
Panelists identified several content issues that arose in the course of using 
WebMILS for assessing compliance.  As noted in the discussion of individual indicators 
in the previous section, panelists often found that there was simply insufficient 
information available to make an assessment.  This is not a criticism of WebMILS, but, 
rather, a commentary on what information is available generally and, more specifically, 
what is available on the Worldwide Web (Web).  Although the range of information 
sources accessed through the Internet has increased exponentially, there are still major 
gaps, particularly for developing countries.  Even for the ILO, which has an extensive 
Web presence, key reports may not be accessible electronically.  For example, panelists 
noted, as did Monitoring International Labor Standards, that ILO Article 22 reports, in 
which countries report on their performance with regard to conventions they have 
ratified, are an important source that is not currently available through the Internet.  
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WebMILS, by its very nature, draws exclusively from the Web and that creates a de facto 
limit on what is included. 
Panelists also mentioned the importance of the user’s background for the proper 
interpretation of some WebMILS sources.  For instance, one might be tempted to judge a 
country’s labor relations compliance based on the number of complaints lodged against 
it.  This, however, could be misleading.  One panelist noted that there are more labor 
relations complaints to the ILO about Canada than Colombia, where violence against 
trade unionists is a major problem.  Beyond understanding the inherent limitations of data 
collection or what is available on the Web, there may also be issues of interpretation of 
reports.  For example, some ILO documents use diplomatic language in which a strong 
criticism may be expressed in a muted and polite manner.  An unsophisticated user might 
overlook what is intended as a serious concern because of the careful way it is articulated. 
All of the panels expressed the idea that media sources, which are not included in 
WebMILS, can be an important source of information, particularly about current labor 
situations.  The WebMILS designers did not include media sources because of concerns 
about the objectivity and consistency in news reports.  They acknowledge, however, that 
media reports “may serve as a barometer of labor conditions.” (Monitoring International 
Labor Standards, p. 37, footnote).  Panelists felt that media sources should be considered, 
recognizing that care is needed in interpreting news reports.  One panelist described 
newspaper stories as useful for providing facts, such as whether or not there was a strike, 
but less reliable in their characterization of a strike’s causes or legal status.  Without 
having someone “on the ground” in a country, newspapers can provide a picture of the 
current situation. 
Structure and Function of WebMILS10   
Panelists identified functional aspects of WebMILS that they felt could be 
addressed to improve its use.  First, as with other databases, system maintenance and 
updating are ongoing challenges.  Some WebMILS links to external sites aren’t 
operational and there are instances in which the names of organizations have changed but 
this is not reflected in the database.  Also, although there is a link for users to suggest 
additional resources, it is unclear whether WebMILS has been updated to include 
information sources that have emerged since the database was created.  
In terms of ease of use, some panelists expressed no concerns.  Others, however, 
described it as unwieldy and less efficient then they would have expected.  One 
individual who was very familiar with international sources, was particularly critical of 
WebMILS, noting that he found it much easier to just go directly to those sources.   
The problems that were identified are related both to the architecture of the site 
and lack of a search mechanism of the sort that Internet users have come to expect.  As 
discussed earlier, a large portion of WebMILS is devoted to explicating the labor 
                                                 
10 Since the conclusion of research on this project, WebMILS has been revamped and updated. The revision 
of WebMILS took into account panelists’ suggestions described in this report, including those concerning 
structure, function and search capability. 
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standards, the indicators, and the information sources.  Most information sources are the 
same for each country.  For instance, one is directed to the same ILO, UN, or U.S. 
government sources whether assessing Afghanistan or Zimbabwe.  The current 
WebMILS structure, however, suggests that the process is more “country-specific” than 
is the case.  For example, to get to sources for assessing a country, one first selects a 
country (through the “Search WebMILS” link) and then a labor standard.  The indicators 
for that labor standard are listed, but clicking on any indicator takes one to a general 
description of the indicator rather than to content related to the country that had been 
selected.  When the user scrolls down to the “Sources” part of the page, most of the 
information sources—with the exception of the “national sources”—are the same for all 
of the countries.   
Panelists also noted that the indicators listed on a country’s page are not linked to 
the relevant sources.  Instead, the sources are presented in a separate section, following 
the listing of indicators.  As one panelist remarked:  
At first I thought that if you clicked on an indicator it would take you to the 
precise sources.  But you have to go to the bottom of whatever sources are there 
to try to figure it out. 
The current WebMILS structure, by having the user first select a country before going to 
individual labor standards and their indicators, gives the impression that the page will be 
more specific to the country than is the case.  Once at the listing of indicators for a 
country, as suggested in the comment above, the user expects there to be a link to the 
relevant source(s).  But this is not currently the case.   
Search capabilities and WebMILS  
The navigation issues related to the architecture of WebMILS touches upon 
another recurring theme among the panelists:  the desirability of more targeted search 
capabilities.  Searching on the Web has become increasingly sophisticated in the years 
since WebMILS was first designed and this has changed the efficiency of searching as 
well as the users’ expectations for how an Internet resource can function.  One panelist 
remarked:   
I do a Google search for so much of my writing.  In this case it is so 
unnatural to be limited to these sources of information. …With the limited 
number of sources [in WebMILS], they may be more objective and more 
vetted in a way, but things get lost and you never hear about a problem 
that could put your mind in a different direction. 
The dominance of searching with Google and other search engines shapes the template 
for how users expect to use websites.  In the words of another panelist:   
If I could take a magic wand and do one or two things, I would create a 
search engine [for WebMILS] that had the capacity to look at all of the 
sources and documents at one time rather than having to go into each and 
try to figure out how to get to where you needed to go.   
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For somebody that does not spend a lot of time on the Internet with these 
searches, there was a level of frustration.  This is hard.  If I could go to the 
DoL WebMILS area and search all of the documents with a fairly robust 
search tool so that I can refine it in a way that identifies key words and 
really gets me to where I needed to be, … to not only what the government 
had on its books in terms of laws but also reaction to the adequacy of 
those laws from various stake holders, all of that in one place, I imagine it 
would reduce the effort and allow more access into the sources. 
Given this view, it is not surprising that some of the panelists, particularly those who 
were more familiar with key sources, such as the ILO and the State Department, went 
directly to those sources, rather than restricting their information collection to WebMILS.  
This was at variance with the instructions to panelists for this evaluation, but it is 
probably indicative of how those with experience in international labor rights would 
proceed in assessing compliance. 
Although general web searches are not limited to information sources that have 
been vetted for consistency or objectivity, they are a useful tool in assessing compliance.  
For example, we can look at Discrimination in Country D.11  The first “legal framework” 
indicator under Discrimination is whether the country has ratified ILO Convention 100 
on equal remuneration.  Using WebMILS, a user would first select Country D (from the 
Search WebMILS link), then select Discrimination.  The indicators would be listed.  The 
user would then go down to the Sources section, which follows the list of indicators and 
select the ILO APPLIS database.  Selecting APPLIS would first go to a screen explaining 
that one is leaving the Department of Labor site for an external one and then to ILO’s 
APPLIS home page, where one can find a list of the conventions ratified by Country D.  
The steps in this process are displayed in figure 4, below.  
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11 The examples used in this exercise, are based on a real country.  It was not one of the countries examined 
by the panelists.  
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An alternative way of finding this ratification information would be to do a 
Google search instead of using WebMILS.  Searching on “ILO Convention 100 Country 
D,” the first four of the hundreds of web pages retrieved are: (1) a 2007 report from the 
International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) on the core labor standards in Country 
D; (2) a report on Country D by the NGO Anti-Slavery International; (3) an ILO news 
release about “decent work” in Country D; and (4) a Department of Labor-ILAB report 
about child labor in Country D.  The ITUC report included Country D’s ratification of 
ILO Convention 100.  It also provided additional commentary/analysis relevant to both 
the convention and other aspects of discrimination. 
Although this Google search on a ratification indicator successfully retrieved 
useful information, searches on other indicators were less helpful.  For example, looking 
at the first “government performance” indicator—affirmative action—none of the first 
four web pages retrieved provided information relevant to Country D’s affirmative action 
programs.  As noted in Appendix J, however, panelists also found little or no information 
for this indicator using WebMILS.  A Google search on the first indicator under 
“outcomes,” led to UN/UNICEF web pages.  These are the same sources found through 
WebMILS.   
Internet searches, such as those with Google, offer an important resource, but they 
do not target sources that have been evaluated for reliability.  The sources available 
through WebMILS, on the other hand, have been vetted and provide the user a measure 
of confidence in their accuracy.  The experience of the panels suggests that Internet 
searches can be a useful tool in assessing compliance, although the sources found must be 
used with care.  It also raises the question of whether a search capacity could be added to 
WebMILS to streamline its use.  
THE PANEL PROCESS 
The process for assessing compliance envisioned by the NAS-ILAB involves 
experts individually assessing labor standard indicators and then coming together as a 
panel to discuss these assessments and resolve differences.  In examining the panel 
process in this evaluation, we can look at the composition of the panels, the pre-meeting 
orientation of the panelists, and the meeting itself. 
Composition of the panels 
For the evaluation, the 3-person panels were made up of individuals with a variety 
of experience in international labor standards—activists, academics, business consultants, 
and representatives of multi-stake holder groups.  Each panel included one person with 
field experience in the region or country being assessed.  Two of the panels also included 
others who had some experience in the country.  Typically, the panelist with experience 
in the country did not consider himself or herself a “country expert” or specialist in that 
country; rather, each was an expert in international labor rights, with some direct field 
experience in that country.  This distinction is relevant for the panel process.  It is 
conceivable that a country expert might dominate discussion, particularly in the face of 
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limited documentary information.  The panel discussions did not reveal such a dynamic, 
although knowledge of the country was an important contribution to the discussions.  One 
of the panelists with country-specific experience remarked during the post-panel 
interview: 
Throughout the process I was wondering if I didn’t have some knowledge 
of [Country A] whether we would have discussed the non-counting of 
people, or the non-reporting on significant industrial activity in the 
country and the labor situation of those industries.   
In the panel discussion itself, he also mentioned that he felt that “you can’t isolate what 
you know from what you read.”  Another panelist remarked how his overall view of the 
country impacted his assessments: 
This is not a country that is consciously taking large-scale measures to destroy 
trade unions.  [Country B] is a struggling democracy.  It is not Colombia or some 
of the other countries.  I gave it some latitude for the feeling behind it.  If it had 
been Myanmar, I would have evaluated everything with a much more suspicious 
eye.  This assessment of the country is not based on the data sources but on my 
experience. 
Knowledge of the country also may have influenced the process that panelists 
used in their individual assessments.  A panelist with experience in the country described 
how his background led him to use sources beyond what was available on WebMILS: 
Since I have some experience in [Country C], I went through what I have 
already accumulated …  I posed a couple of questions to the State Dept. 
Regional Labor Counsel and he sent me copies of the new laws.  So it was 
clear that the whole legal regime had changed.  Then I went more 
systematically through the indicators and the sources and materials that 
were listed on WebMILS and I tried to follow that structure first before 
going to what I knew were the other sources. 
Another panelist mused about whether the perspective gained from the sources on 
WebMILS would produce an understanding that corresponded with the more 
comprehensive view of someone familiar with an individual country:  
I was given an area of the world and a country that I did not know well.  I 
think that was intentional.  And it would have been interesting to me to use 
the system in a different situation; to see if the tool would allow me the 
ability to make judgments and come to conclusions that are consistent 
with what I know to be true in the real world…it certainly would be 
interesting for me to take this tool and go to a country that I know a lot 
better, China or some place in eastern Asia, and undertake a similar 
process and look and see if it came out anywhere close to what I know to 
be the case.   
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The mix of backgrounds and orientations on the panels also enhanced the 
quality of the discussion.  Panelists were aware of these differences and 
occasionally they directly factored into the discussion.  As one panelist remarked:  
Each of us brought to it our background.  So we all had different sorts of 
takes.  Having someone with a legal background was great.  Having 
someone with an academic background around labor and labor movement 
issues was useful and brought a good perspective to it.  And the practical 
experience I brought was useful…I thought that was a good match. 
That panelist also noted some of the specific contributions of those with different 
backgrounds: 
[Panelist b] certainly had really good points to make about how the law 
works.  When she said it, I thought, yes she is right.  But as a non-lawyer it 
wasn’t the first thing that came to my mind. 
As another panelist remarked, the discussion, involving individuals with a range of 
backgrounds “was interesting because more issues came up than I would have expected.” 
Overall, it was very helpful to have at least one panelist with experience in the 
country being assessed.  That individual was able to identify issues that were not apparent 
from the Internet sources and to offer contextual perspectives that enriched the panel 
discussions.  The mix of professional background/experience also added to the 
discussion.  
Pre-panel preparation 
As described above and in Appendix A, in preparation for the assessment 
task, panelists were provided with a memo summarizing WebMILS, the matrix 
approach, and the expectations of them as panelists.  They also received a copy of 
Monitoring International Labor Standards and a bound set of response sheets for 
the indicators they were to assess (Appendix B).  Some panelists suggested that 
more training would have been helpful prior to doing the individual assessments.  
This training could provide more information about the sources and their use.  As 
one panelists noted in the post-panel interview:   
As a recommendation for a process that would work better, I would think 
that a bit more guidance to the assessors would be helpful.  It would have 
been helpful to say you should look at X, Y, Z.  Here are some of the basics 
you should do and if you do anything beyond that you should record it.  
All three of us would have done at least the basic stuff with a greater 
degree of consistency.  …  There is nothing in the evaluation process that 
we did that suggested we should do any comparative stuff at all.  All three 
of us had experience doing international stuff and had points of 
comparison.  It would be better to systematize that by saying here is a 
really bad example of setting up a system with regard to the right to 
organize and bargain collectively.  And you might draw on countries 
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…where unions are not permitted or…where unions are state dominated.  
And here is [a country with strong labor rights that] is completely 
different and that is another point of comparison.  And you can rate this 
country in between. 
A panelist on another panel expressed a similar idea: 
What I probably would do as a first step is get everyone together to talk 
about the process, figure out everyone’s perspective—maybe see if there is 
a set of better laid out criteria.  If X, Y, Z is present we think we are going 
to give it this kind of assessment.  Then everyone goes off on their own and 
then comes back together to compare. 
On the other hand, Monitoring International Labor Standards doesn’t provide such 
guidelines.  If such pre-assessment training is to be given, these guidelines would have to 
be developed.  
Another issue is whether a pre-assessment meeting would compromise the 
independence of the individual assessments.  In the evaluation, panelists were not told 
who else was participating on the panel, because of concern that knowing the identities of 
the others could possibly influence how they assessed compliance.  As one panelist put it:  
To do the individual assessments first and then to come together as a panel was 
useful.  If we had met first we might have had a “group psyche.”  If panelists met 
first they might gauge where things are going.  It is useful to come to own 
judgments first.   
Organization of the panel meeting itself 
A number of aspects of the panel meeting—such how the discussion was 
structured and efforts to resolve differences in assessments—have already been discussed 
in earlier sections of this report and in Appendices E and G.  In general, from the 
perspective of the panelists the process went well and the discussion brought additional 
viewpoints on the country’s compliance with labor standards.  In the post-panel 
interviews, panelists were uniformly positive about their personal reactions to the 
process.  For example,  
-I thought it was really excellent.  They were good people. They both had serious 
strengths that they brought to this exercise.  It was very, very useful. 
-It was interesting because more issues came up than I would have expected.  
That was a good part of the panel discussion.  There were things I thought 
about during the discussion that I had not previously thought about.  I had not 
thought about the common law/civil law context or bias.   
-I thought the whole process was quite well thought-through.  This was not 
a light, frivolous exercise.  Spending 30 hours on a website is quite 
intensive.  And to spend 8 hours in a room comparing notes with two 
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other people—that was not a frivolous exercise.  The conclusions that 
you are likely to draw from it will be substantial and substantiated 
because the process was rigorous. 
But, if the goal of the process is to reach a consensus on assessments of 
compliance for the indicators, none of the panels reached that outcome.  In part, this may 
be a function of time constraints of a one-day meeting.  The dinner meeting on the 
previous evening, in the words of one panelist, “made it a little easier for us to dive in the 
next day.”  Despite this, even without trying to reach a consensus on the indicators in 
dispute, their sheer number presents a serious time challenge.  One panelist quipped that 
they could have spent a half day on each indicator. 
One the other hand, a significant portion of the discussion time in the evaluation 
was devoted to discussing the task itself—use of WebMILS, the meaning and wording of 
individual indicators, and other aspects of the NAS-ILAB method.  Presumably this 
would take up less time once those issues were resolved, although it is likely that any set 
of experts would have their own questions about the indicators, information sources, and 
assessments. 
In addition to the discussion of the individual indicators, panels might be expected 
to reach a broader conclusion or set of conclusions about the level of compliance of the 
country as a whole.  The NAS-ILAB matrix methodology doesn’t provide directions for 
how to move from the assessment of individual indicators to more general conclusions 
for a country.  As a step in this direction for the evaluation, panelists were asked for an 
overall rating of the level of compliance for each labor standard for the three broad areas:  
legal framework; government performance; and outcomes.  As described above, Panel A 
did not get very far in this task.  Panels B and C did reach some tentative conclusions (see 
table 8).  In the course of this effort, panelists noted that the indicators address a wide 
range of issues with different levels of importance.  One panelist, referring to the effort to 
create an overall rating, noted: 
We did not have a discussion about prioritizing.  We did not attempt to 
prioritize.  But in our own heads we gave more attention to some.  And it 
did come out in the summary at the end. 
This question of prioritizing the indicators came up in each of the panels.  One of the 
panelists for Country C described the assessment task, with its total of sixty-nine 
indicators for the two labor standards (Freedom of Association and Discrimination), as 
“artificial” when it came to trying to draw an overall conclusion.   
With this exercise you had to spend a lot of time searching for information 
that would not necessarily have been prioritized [if I were doing this 
myself]…  Reporters in the State Department too will be picking and 
choosing from things.  But for the purpose of this experiment obviously 
you wanted each and every indicator.  In a sense that is artificial. 
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Although there was general agreement that some indicators were more important than 
others, the issue of how one would set priorities among the indicators is complicated and 
raises a number of issues.  One panelist talked about this complexity, referring to 
Colonial-period legislation that gave local African chiefs authority to conscript citizens 
into labor:  
Prioritizing indicators is a tough question.  My training tells me that 
violation of any provisions of an instrument is relevant.  I would leave it to 
the evaluation, which of these is a killer problem.  For example, if there is 
something in the legislation that allows chiefs to impose forced labor but 
in fact no authorization has been given for that for 20 years—then it is a 
theoretical rather than a national problem.  I would want to leave it to the 
evaluation which is more important. 
Prioritizing is a theoretical question that is difficult to answer.  For 
example, if you have an overall system of freedom of association that 
allows workers and employers to organize, that allows collective 
bargaining and even promotes it, but it does not allow for workers’ 
organizations to use premises on the work place, it is a violation but not a 
big one.  It is not insignificant but it is of a lesser order than a refusal to 
register trade unions. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The NAS-ILAB matrix methodology can be understood in terms of three 
elements.  First, a set of indicators were developed for each of the five labor standards. 
These indicators explicate each of the labor standards and, in doing so, increase 
transparency in assessing compliance with international standards.  This is an important 
advance and the panelists applauded this effort.  As one put it, “Kudos to the effort . . .  
setting up a grouping of indicators on these labor standards is important, and useful, and 
largely successful.”  It was noted that the indicators and WebMILS could be very useful 
to other audiences—such as businesses considering international investments and the 
associated risk analysis. 
In the course of assessing the indicators, the panelists identified a number of 
modifications that are documented in this report.  Some are matters of wording and 
clarification.  For others, however, questions were raised about whether the indicators 
reflected international standards or, rather, highlighted other issues that were relevant to 
labor rights in the country but were not properly characterized in terms of “level of 
compliance.”   
The second part of the NAS-ILAB approach was establishing WebMILS as a 
source of information for assessing the labor standard indicators.  The evaluation 
analyzed the content and functioning of WebMILS.  Panelists felt that WebMILS linked 
the user to relevant sources and, by including only sources that they felt were relatively 
objective and reliable, it was particularly helpful for a user who is less familiar with these 
sources.  The question of maintenance and updating of the site was raised in response to 
encountering non-functioning links and changes in the labor standards environment that 
were not reflected in the database.   
A number of issues emerged about the structure and function of WebMILS.  In 
broad terms, it appears that the structure of WebMILS does not clearly differentiate 
between generic and country-specific information.  Also, panelists felt that there should 
be a more direct link between the specific indicators and the relevant information sources.  
One possible alteration in the architecture of the site is displayed in figure 5, below.   
This potential change would more clearly present the information about the 
WebMILS project, the labor standards and indicators, and the matrix approach in one 
area (the left branch, in figure 5).  For those using WebMILS to assess compliance, the 
right branch would take them to the relevant indicators, with links to the specific sources 
for each indicator.  As noted in the figure, most of these links would be the same for all 
countries, while others would go to the “national sources” and any other country-specific 
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Panelists also raised an underlying concern with using WebMILS as the primary 
source of information:  only using information available through the Internet.  There is a 
great deal of unevenness in what is available in electronic form, particularly in 
developing countries.  For many of the indicators, the panelists found little or no 
information and there was a recurring theme that what one needed was a local expert—
someone “on the ground”—who could provide up-to-date and contextual information.  
The decision to not include media sources in WebMILS was cited as another limit on 
securing current information. 
The third aspect of the NAS-ILAB method was the matrix layout itself—the 
characterization of each indicator in terms of three levels of compliance and directions of 
change.  The panelists independently assessed the indicators and then met as a group to 
discuss their assessments and resolve differences in assessments.  This overall process 
appeared to work well, although there was some suggestion that more training, and 
perhaps a pre-assessment meeting, might have been useful.  Panelists identified a number 
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of problems in the formulation of the current set of indicators.  They also raised the 
possibility that a scale with more options (e.g., five levels of compliance) might be 
preferable, although there was no consensus about this.   
The matrix formulation is presented in Monitoring International Labor Standards 
as “one possible way to analyze the data” (p. 27).  It provides an intuitive way to 
integrate the individual assessments of indicators for each labor standards.  Unlike the 
hypothetical example in the text, in the evaluation there were relatively few indicators on 
which most of the panelists agreed in their independent assessments.  Although most of 
these disagreements were relatively minor, the process of reaching a consensus was time-
consuming and often unsuccessful.   
The specification of indicators and the matrix formulations served its purpose of 
creating a way to make the process of assessing compliance less opaque.  The question 
remains, however, of how one moves from assessment of individual indicators to a 
broader assessment of compliance with labor standards in a country.  This is not 
addressed in the specification of the matrix method and led to discussions within the 
panels of differences in the importance of individual indicators and whether priorities 
could be established that furthered an integrated, overall assessment.  As the authors of 
Monitoring International Labor Standard state, “The daunting policy challenge is to 
evaluate indicators of compliance and use them as a basis for policy judgments.” (p.21) 
Based on the experience of the evaluation, there appear to be several directions 
for next steps in developing the NAS-ILAB approach.  These include: 
1. Revision of the current set of indicators to reflect the problems identified by the 
panelists 
This revision could address current problems with wording and the lack of 
fit with the “answer set.”  It could also identify those indicators that are 
more appropriately considered reflections of the conditions in a country 
rather than “compliance,” per se.   
2. Possible reorganization of the indicators to facilitate discussion 
Some structural issues were identified in the course of the pilot test.  For 
example, as noted in this report, “legal framework” indicators did not 
always clearly differentiate between the “letter of the law” and how the 
law is implemented.  In such cases, it may be helpful to integrate 
discussion of the legal indicator(s) with the associated government 
performance indicators.  Although it is important to identify the origin of 
problems (e.g., the laws versus their enforcement), discussion of 
compliance in a country might proceed in a more targeted way if it is 
structured in terms of areas of code compliance rather than always treating 
legal framework and government performance separately. 
3. Modifying the process to include developing a contextual understanding of the 
country to provide an orientation to the panel assessing compliance 
The NAS-ILAB formulation alludes to contextual issues, such as the 
resources available to a country, as an important consideration in assessing 
compliance.  Such factors, however, are not formally integrated into the 
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matrix approach, although there appears to be the expectation that it will 
impact the assessments of indicators.  Some of the indicators—particularly 
those that have been identified as descriptive of the setting rather than 
reflecting questions of “compliance”—can be shifted from the matrix 
formulation to a protocol for developing a contextual description of the 
country, which can then provide background for panelists assessing 
compliance in that country. 
4. Developing guidance for moving from the assessment of individual indicators 
to an overall introduction 
The effort in the pilot test to make an overall assessment of the legal 
framework, government performance, and outcomes continually came up 
against the question of how one pulls together the individual assessments 
of the indicators.  This was often articulated in terms of establishing 
priorities reflecting the relative importance of indicators.  This, however, 
is a thorny problem.  Although it may not be productive to try to establish 
fixed priorities among the indicators, developing some guidance for how 
to move from the specifics to an overall assessment would be a significant 




Orientation Letter to Panelists 
 
INSTITUTE OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
1111 EAST CATHERINE STREET 
ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN   48109-2054 
(734) 763-3116                       WWW.ILIR.UMICH.EDU 
 
 To: <panelist name> 
  Panelist for <Country A> 
 From: Larry Root and Ada Verloren 
 Re: Instructions to panelists for the evaluation of the ILAB matrix 
   approach to monitoring international labor standards 
 Date: February 21, 2008 
 
Thank you for agreeing to serve as an expert panelist for the assessment of the 
Department of Labor’s matrix approach to assessing the status of labor standards.  As 
we’ve discussed, the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences 
worked with the Department of Labor’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) to 
create a method for monitoring the status of a country’s adherence to international labor 
standards.  The University of Michigan is working with DoL-ILAB to test this method 
for several countries.  We are very grateful for your help in this effort. 
 
The proposed method for assessing a country’s labor standards is described in a 
book by the National Research Council, Monitoring International Labor Standards:  
Techniques and Sources of Information (copy enclosed).  Briefly, there are five key labor 
standards addressed: 
 
1. Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining 
2. Forced or compulsory labor 
3. Child labor 
4. Discrimination 
5. Acceptable conditions of work 
 
For each of the labor standards, indicators have been defined that reflect: (a) the legal 
framework related to the labor standard within a country; (b) government performance in 
implementing the labor standard (both in terms of effort and effectiveness); and (c) 
outcome measures related to the labor standard.  These indicators were designed with a 
two-fold purpose: to assess the level of compliance in the country (some problems, more 
extensive problems, or severe problems) and identify whether the situation is changing 
(improving, steady state, or worsening). 
 
The proposed method calls for assessors to independently evaluate the indicators 
associated with a given labor standard as described above.   The findings are organized 
within a matrix that has level of compliance on one axis and direction of change on the 
other (see pages 30-31 of Monitoring International Labor Standards for an example).   
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Finally, assessors come together as a panel to discuss their individual assessments, and 
attempt to reach a consensus evaluation.   
 
The National Research Council and Department of Labor also identified and 
organized sources of data that could be used to assess the labor standards.  These are 




In addition to providing links to key documents for assessing labor standards, WebMILS 
also contains background information on the labor standards and ILAB matrix approach.   
 
It is expected that the panelists will use WebMILS as the primary tool for locating 
the information needed to make their assessments.12  Selecting “Search WebMILS” on 
the home page brings one to a listing of countries.  On this page, the user also has the 
option of searching by the type of information source (e.g., international organizations 
such as the ILO or the Asian Development Bank).  Selecting a specific country leads to a 
selection of the broad areas of labor standards.  Clicking on one of these areas, takes one 
to a listing of the individual indicators, followed by sources of information about these 
indicators.  Appendix A-1 provides some screen captures from WebMILS.  Although not 
the primary focus of the evaluation, your assessment of the use of WebMILS for 





The research design calls for three panelists to assess two labor standards for a 
country.  This assessment is a two-stage process: panelists first provide an independent 
assessment of compliance and progress for each indicator.  The panelists then come 
together as a group to discuss their individual assessments and seek to reach a consensus 
evaluation.  
 
Stage 1 - Independent Assessment: Panelists independently consider all indicators 
for a given labor standard.  For each indicator, the panelist provides a 
rating for the level of country-level compliance and indicates whether 
there is a trend toward improvement or worsening.  Panelists then submit 
their ratings by means of an online data input system to the project staff at 
the University of Michigan, who will organize panelist findings into 
matrices that have level of compliance on one axis and direction of change 
on the other.  Project staff will use these matrices to compare the ratings 
across panelists and identify differences in assessments between members 
of a given panel.   
                                                 
12 One goal of the evaluation is to assess how individual experts make assessments based on the same set of 
data/information.  If an individual expert on a panel identifies relevant sources for assessment that are not a 
part of WebMILS, he/she is expected to bring this to the attention of the project staff, who will make it 
available to the other members of the panel. 
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Stage 2 - Panel Deliberations:  After the individual assessments have been 
completed, the panelists will convene at University of Michigan for a one-
day meeting.  At that meeting, differences in individual assessments will 
be discussed and the panel will attempt to come to a consensus for each 
indicator on level of compliance and progress for that country.  The 
panelists will also be asked to discuss their experience in making their 
assessments and ways in which the process could be improved.   
 
Our analysis for the evaluation of the matrix methodology will use quantitative 
measures of the extent of agreement among panelists in initial independent assessments 
as well as the extent of agreement following the group discussion.  The 
process/discussion will be observed and recorded in order to identify key points as well 
as patterns, such as associations between type of indicators and level of agreement.  We 
also plan to interview each panelist by phone before they convene in Ann Arbor and after 
that meeting.  
 
This evaluation process will be carried out for three countries, with a separate 
team of panelists for each country.  Because this evaluation is intended to evaluate the 
proposed method of assessment, the identity of the three countries will be treated as 
confidential for the purposes of any reports, publications and/or presentations.   
 
Expectations for panelists.  Each of the panels will be responsible for assessing the 
indicators associated with two labor standards:  (1) freedom of association and collective 
bargaining and (2) either forced labor, discrimination, or acceptable conditions of work.  
The assignment of the second core area will be made by the project staff.  As a panelist 
for <Country A>, you will be responsible for assessing the indicators for: 
 
-Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining and 
-Acceptable Conditions of Work 
 
As described above, you will be expected to assess the relevant indicators independently 
and then to participate in a meeting in Ann Arbor, where you will engage in panel 
deliberations in an attempt to reach a consensus assessment, and discuss their experience. 
 
Enclosed is a packet of forms with one page for each of the indicators for 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining and Acceptable Conditions of Work.  
Panelists will submit their assessments via an online version of the form located on the 
website of the University’s Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations:   
 
                           www.ilir.umich.edu/ILAB/Matrix/Panelist/Input/
 
Your Login Name is:    <login name> 
Your Pass Phrase is:     <password> 
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The hard copy forms that are enclosed are intended to provide you with a working 
document on which you can make notes.  These notes can also serve as reminders for the 
group discussion and offer a backup in case of technical problems with the online system. 
 
Assessment of the indicators represents a significant work effort on the part of 
panelists.  Some indicators, such as whether or not a country has ratified a particular ILO 
Convention are straightforward and easy to determine.  Others, however, are more 
difficult to assess.  In some cases, a panelist may feel that there is not enough information 
available to make an assessment.  We do, however, expect that you will make an effort to 
come to an assessment of each of the indicators in the two core areas being addressed by 
the panel.  If there are indicators for which no assessment is made, we request that you 
use the “comments” section to explain why you have not made an assessment.  
 
Part of the overall evaluation of the matrix is estimating the time necessary to 
make the assessments.  Based on a pilot test, we estimate that panelists should be 
prepared to devote up to 40 hours to this assessment task.  In practice, you may find that 
it takes less than 40 hours.  We request that you keep track of the time it takes you to do 
the assessments.  You are not expected to devote more than 40 hours to the assessment 
even if there are still indicators for which no conclusion on an assessment has been 
reached.   
 
As discussed above, each panel will convene at the University of Michigan to 
deliberate in an attempt to reach a consensus assessment and to discuss their experience 
with the assessment.  We plan to schedule these meetings for the first two weeks in May 
and will be contacting you imminently to arrange the specific dates the meeting for your 
3-person country panel.   We expect that the panel will spend one full day during which 
time they will discuss and seek to resolve differences in their independent assessments.  
In order for the staff to prepare of the meeting, panelists will have to complete their 
assessments at least five working days before they are scheduled to meet as a panel in 
Ann Arbor.  In addition to the discussion of the specific indicators and assessments, the 
panelists are expected to share their perspectives on the process of making the 
assessments and ways in which this could be improved.  Project staff will observe and 
record this process. 
 
Given the need to coordinate schedules and prepare for each of the meetings in 
Ann Arbor, it is essential that panelists adhere to their agreed-upon schedule for 
submission of their assessments.  An honorarium of $4,000 will be provided to each 
panelist in recognition of his/her assistance with this project. 
 
We have an excellent group of expert panelists and we are grateful for your 
willingness to participate.  If you have any questions, please don’t hesitate to contact us.  
 
Enclosed: 
Monitoring International Labor Standards (book) 
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For example, selecting Albania leads to a screen listing the broad areas 
 




Selecting Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, goes to: 
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Selecting an individual 
indicator here takes one to 










[the web page continues…]
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Appendix B 
Cover Sheet and Example of a Hard-Copy Assessment Form 
[The bound copy for this panelists included 38 assessment forms for Freedom of 
Association and Collective Bargaining and 37 for Acceptable Conditions of Work] 
 
 
INSTITUTE OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 





Evaluating the ILAB Matrix Approach to  
Monitoring International Labor Standards 
 
Panelist Forms for  






Freedom of Association  
   and Collective Bargaining 
 
Acceptable Conditions of Work 
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Panelist Form for Assessment of Indicators 
[example of panelist form] 
Area:  Freedom of Association 
 
Indicator: A-3. the extent to which there are legal restrictions on the ability of 
certain categories of workers to organize (such as civil servants, teachers, 





Level of problems: 
 
□ Some problems  □ More extensive problems □ Severe problems □ Not determined 
 
Direction of Change: 
 
□ Improving  □ Steady state  □ Worsening  □ Not determined 
 
Basis of assessment: 
 






Did you use a source not in WebMILS    □ Yes     □ No 
 




Confidence in assessment: □ low confidence—highly speculative 
    □ moderate confidence—some objective evidence 
    □ confident—clear indications, strong objective evidence 
 


























Questions for Pre-Panel Telephone Interview 
 
Panelist:  _____________________________  Date: ___________________ 
 
A. The assessment process generally 
 











2. In general, did you feel that the goal for doing the assessments was clear? 
 
Very clear        Clear         Neutral        Not clear      Very unclear 
       □                  □                 □                  □                      □ 
 







3. In general, did you feel that the criteria for assessing individual indicators were clear? 
 
Very clear        Clear         Neutral        Not clear      Very unclear 
       □                  □                 □                  □                      □ 
 







4. How would you characterize differences in assessing the three types of indicators:  
legal framework, government performance, and overall outcomes?  
 
Legal framework 
Easier to                         Same as                           More difficult 
Assess                            other two                              to assess 
    □                                        □                                            □ 
Government performance 
Easier to                         Same as                           More difficult 
Assess                            other two                              to assess 
    □                                        □                                            □ 
 
Overall outcomes 
Easier to                         Same as                           More difficult 
Assess                            other two                              to assess 
    □                                        □                                            □ 
 







5. How would you characterize differences in assessing the level of compliance 
compared to direction of change? 
 
Level of compliance (compared to direction of change) 
Easier to                         About the                           More difficult 
Assess                                Same                                   to assess 
    □                                        □                                            □ 
 








6. Were the areas in which you thought there were particular gaps in the information 
available? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 







7. Were there information sources that you found particularly helpful? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 







8. Did you feel that there were biases in sources (both quantitative and qualitative)? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 
If “yes,” were they (check all that apply) 
□ Complaint-driven sources 
□ Reports skewed for political reasons 
□ Based on unrepresentative sample 
□ Other ________________________________________________ 
 








9.  Did you feel that some of the information sources were flawed to the extent that they 
were not useful? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 








B. Use of WebMILS 
 
10. What is your overall impression of the usefulness of WebMILS for making these 
assessments?   
 
Very useful      Useful        Neutral      Not useful 
       □                  □                 □                  □         
 







11.  How difficult was it to locate information on WebMILS? 
 
 
Very easy      Somewhat easy     Neutral      somewhat difficult         Very difficult 
       □                      □                       □                      □                                    □  
 








12. Did the data seem to be relatively up-to-date? 
 
Up-to-date             Neutral        Not up-to-date 
       □                          □                       □  
 







13 Did you feel you had adequate information about the data sources to judge their 
reliability? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 







14. Were some relevant data only available in non-English language sources? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 







15.  Are you aware of appropriate data that are not available in WebMILS? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 








C. Suggestions for improvements 
 
16.  Do you have any suggestions for changes that would improve the assessment 
process? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 







17. Do you have any suggestions for changes in WebMILS? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 







18.  Are there other reactions that you have to the assessment experience? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 







19. Do you have any questions/expectations for the panelist group meeting? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 








Agenda for Panel Meeting 
 
 
Monitoring International Labor Standards 
Meeting of Panelists for <Country C> 
 
Labor Standards: 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
Discrimination and Equality 
 
Panelists:      University of Michigan Personnel 
<name of panelist a> Larry Root 
<name of panelist b> Ada Verloren 
<name of panelist c>  
 
 
Dinner meeting (Wednesday, May 21, 2008) 
1. Introductions of project and individuals participating 
2. Overview of tasks for main session 
a. Discussion of individual indicators, differences in assessments and 
rationales, and possible re-assessment in light of this discussion 
b. Discussion of the Matrix approach itself as a guide for assessing labor 
conditions in a country 
Main session (Thursday, May 22, 2008) 
8:30 – 9:00 Differences in assessments based on answer set or interpretation 
Identification/discussion of indicators for which the panelists have 
suggested that the answer set (level of compliance: some problems, more 
extensive problems, severe problems) does not provide appropriate 
responses or the interpretation of the indicator is ambiguous 
 
Discussion of strategies used in such situations 
9:00-2:00 Discussion of individual indicators  
? Differences in assessments among the panelists 
? Rationale and evidence for assessments 
? Attempt to come to common assessment when differences exist 
12:00-1:00 Lunch 
1:00-2:00 (continuation of discussion of individual indicators) 
2:00-4:00 Discussion of the matrix approach for assessing labor conditions 
? Level of compliance and direction of change 
? Range of indicators—indicators to add/subtract 
? WebMILS as a source and additional data sources 
? Additional/alternative approaches for assessing compliance 
? Process: individual assessments followed by group discussion 




Post-Panel Questions for Telephone Interview 
 
Panelist:  _____________________________  Date: ___________________ 
 
 
1. Did your feel that the meeting addressed what you had expected? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 






2. Was the organization of time appropriate? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 







3. Did you feel that the other panelists approached the assessment task in a similar way to 
how you approached it? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 












□ Yes        □ No 
 







5. Is there anything further that occurred to you with regard to the assessment exercise 
(e.g., indicators to add/subtract?  ways of prioritizing indicators?  additional data 
sources?) 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 







6. Did you find that discussion/interaction with other panelists useful? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 








7. Do you have any further thoughts about your overall assessment of the matrix 
approach to monitoring international labor standards? 
 
□ Yes        □ No 
 









Notes from Panel Discussions 
 
Each panel began with an evening meeting followed by a full day panel meeting.  
The work plan for each panel meeting included discussion of the individual indicators, 
with a focus on those indicators for which there was greater disagreement based on the 
individual assessments undertaken prior to the meeting.  Discussion of indicators was 
followed by discussion of the ILAB-NAS matrix approach generally and WebMILS as a 
key information source.   
 
Country A (May 11-12, 2008) 
Labor Standards: Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
   Acceptable Conditions of Work 
 
Panelists: 
• Professor of industrial relations 
• Union-based analyst and program director with focus on international labor 
conditions 
• Professor of law, with focus on international and comparative law 
 
This first panel meeting followed the agenda and provided the model which was 
largely replicated in the two subsequent panel meetings.  At the dinner meeting on the 
evening before the full-day session, we discussed the project, the backgrounds of the 
individual panelists, and the plans for the main session the following day.  It turned out 
that two of the panelists had previously met at a small labor rights conference several 
years earlier.  One of those two had also worked on projects with labor-based 
organization where the third panelist works.  
 
The main session the following day began at 8:30 a.m.  In preparation for the 
session, the University of Michigan research staff had reviewed the assessments of each 
of the panelists, grouping the indicators into three groups by the extent of agreement 
among the panelists on their assessments:  high, medium, or low agreement.  “Low” 
agreement generally included those indicators for which each of the three panelists rated 
the indicator’s level of compliance differently.  In some cases, there might have been two 
different ratings plus differences in rating the direction of change.  “High” agreement 
usually meant that the panelists rated the level of compliance the same. 
 
The pre-panel review of individual ratings also noted panelists’ comments that 
raised questions for discussion about individual indicators, the assessment process itself, 
and WebMILS as an information source.  For example, the research staff noted that 
panelists identified indicators that did not fit with the answer set—that is, they called for 
a “yes/no” response rather than “some problems, more extensive problems, or severe 
problems.”  Questions about whether or not a particular ILO convention had been ratified 
were a clear instance of this issue.  Such questions had been called to the attention of the 
researchers by panelists in our pre-meeting phone interviews.  The individual comments 
also identified indicators which raised questions about interpretation.  For example, 
comments suggested that panelists did not know how to interpret an indicator that asked 
about number of strikes and, if there were many strikes or strikes of long duration, what 
that might indicate about freedom of association 
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Given the time constraints, the research staff estimated that trying to discuss each 
of the 75 indicators (38 for Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining; 37 for 
Acceptable Conditions of Work) would result in just a few minutes discussion of each.  
Instead, the discussion was structured as follows: 
 
-Initial discussion of the indicators for which the answer set (level of compliance: 
some problems, more extensive problems, severe problems) did not 
provide appropriate responses or the interpretation of the indicator is 
ambiguous.  Rather than focus on possible differences in assessments for 
these indicators, the panelists would discuss the problems of using the 
answer set and how the individual panelists addressed this situation 
 
-Discussion of individual indicators for which there was the most disagreement 
among the panelists (agreement was “low”).  Nine of the 75 indicators 
were rated as having low agreement, all but one of which were part of 
Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining.  The discussion of 
“low agreement” indicators was followed by discussion of indicators for 
which there was some disagreement (“medium” agreement).   
 
Following the discussion of each of these indicators, the panelists re-rated 
the indicator by hand.  These assessments were collected at the end of the 
session. 
 
-General discussion of the matrix approach as a guide for assessing labor 
conditions and WebMILS as a data source for this assessment. 
 
The panel discussion, while following the overall format, was free-flowing, so 
that general points about the matrix framework and WebMILS often were interspersed 
with discussions of the indicators.   
 
A number of issues/points came up repeatedly in the discussion, such as: 
 
1. General concern that data sources for many areas were lacking sufficient 
information to make an informed assessment, for example 
a. There is little information about many aspects of government 
performance; panelists often mentioned that one might need “people 
on the ground” locally to get this kind of information 
b. The government data generally does not address the informal sector or 
unregistered workers—a major portion of the workforce in Country A 
c. WebMILS does not seem to have much useful information on many 
areas of government performance (e.g., FoA-CB, B10-13) 
d. The panelists felt that more guidance would be useful to help an 
assessor interpret reports from various sources 
 
2. Need for more guidance on criteria for making assessments of level of 
compliance; for example, should the assessor be comparing the situation 
in a country to some ideal standard or to other countries?  
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3. Mismatch between the answer set and the response that the panelist felt was 
appropriate for an indicator, for example 
a. Some indicators are clearly a “yes” or “no,” rather than “some 
problems, more extensive problems, severe problems, e.g., all of the 
ratification questions) 
b. For some indicators, such as questions about legislation, the wording 
suggests a “yes” or “no” questions (such as “Whether ______ is 
protected in law”); different wording might make it more of an 
assessment question (such as “To what extent is ______ protected by 
law”) 
c. With the answer set, there isn’t an option to say that there is “no 
problem” with regard to an indicator 
d. The panelists felt that having a 5-level answer set might have provided a 
better set of options, providing a “no problem” option and some 
distinction between “more extensive problems” and “severe problems” 
 
4. In assessing whether compliance on an indicator is changing, need to have 
some guidance on the time frame for making such an assessment. 
 
In practice, two of the panelists used the year 2000 as a rough beginning 
point for assessing change.  The third panelist used the last 2-3 years. 
 
5. Media coverage could be a useful additional source of information. 
 
Media coverage is specifically discussed in the Monitoring International 
Labor Standards book as not intended as a primary source because of 
difficulties in assessing accuracy.  The panelists felt that media sources 
could be a useful addition to WebMILS (e.g., http://labourstart.org/  
provides a searchable listing of international news reports relevant to trade 
unions) 
 
6. Court cases, such as from the European Court of Justice, the European Court of 
Human Rights, and the inter-American system, could provide useful 
information, especially because the legal briefs often provide a thorough 
view of the context from the point of view of both the plaintiff and 
defendant. 
 
7. Some questions appear to be addressing two or more different issues.  For 
example, FOA-CB B-1 includes job actions taken as retaliation along with 
murder—qualitatively different actions. 
 
8. There aren’t any indicators that focus on “civil liberties” (e.g., right of 
assembly, freedom of speech)—important part of labor rights environment 
 
9. Under Acceptable Conditions of Work, unclear how to interpret/rate questions 





Country B (May 14-15, 2008) 
Labor Standards: Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
   Forced or Compulsory Labor 
 
Panelists: 
• Independent consultant on corporate social responsibility 
• Independent consultant on labor conditions and labor rights 
• Former ILO official with extensive experience in employment and human 
rights 
 
The County B panel went as planned.  A representative from ILAB attended the 
panel meeting as an observer.  There was somewhat less variation in the individual 
ratings in the Country B panel compared with the Country A panel.  For example, there 
were only six indicators that we characterized as having “low agreement” compared with 
nine for Country A.  The discussion of individual indicators therefore more quickly 
turned to those for there was “medium” agreement. 
 
The issue of answer-set problems for “yes-no” indicators was noted.  It was 
suggested that it is not appropriate to talk about “compliance” for indicators for which 
there is not a formal obligation in international conventions.  For example, according to 
the panelist with extensive ILO experience, indicator B-7 under Forced or Compulsory 
Labor (FCL) concerns receipt of technical assistance.  Because there is no international 
obligation, “level of compliance” is not formally applicable. 
 
Some of the points raised in discussion:13
 
1. Indicators sometimes included more than one issue.  This could raise problems 
of interpretation/application.  For example, in FoA A-2—“whether there 
are legal provisions that entitle workers or employers to establish and join 
organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization”—
what is meant by the addition of the phrase “without prior authorization?”  
This seems to make the indicator less clear. 
 
2. With regard to ratification questions, there are countries that have not ratified 
ILO #87 but they have ratified the two covenants associated with it. 
 
3. From the perspective of businesses, “risk assessment” is a central concern.  The 
matrix approach would be useful for three key goals:  assessing the risk of 
doing business in a country; some measure of whether a country’s labor 
practices are in compliance; and risks associated with potential violations 
of treaty obligations.  From this perspective, the question about specific 
indicators was whether they helped in assessing the risk of doing business 
in a country.  It was noted that businesses typically know little of the ILO 
and its conventions. 
 
During the panel, there was reference to the Equator Principles, a set of 
social and environmental standards created in 2003 by a number of 
                                                 
13 In these notes on the individual panels, some points noted with regard to an earlier panel are not repeated.  
General points, however, may be reiterated when additional examples are provided. 
 73
international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, to 
guide international investment decisions.  The Equator Principles are 
intended to help financial institutions “to be able to better assess, mitigate, 
document and monitor the credit risk and reputation risk associated with 
financing development projects.” [from website:  http://www.equator-
principles.com/faq.shtml]  The Equator Principles are not very specific 
and the labor elements appear to draw heavily upon the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), whose goals statement is summarized as 
“Reducing Poverty, Improving Lives.”  [http://www.ifc.org/]  These 
efforts can be contrasted with the approach used in the “Doing Business” 
ratings, in which more extensive labor protections in a country tends to 
worsen their rating as a business environment.  For example, in the “Doing 
Business” ratings, protections for workers can translate to scores 
indicating greater “rigidity of employment.” 
 
4. It might be helpful to have some general “context” indicators or a narrative way 
of setting the context for a country.  [Note:  A similar point was raised in 
the Country C panel, when it was suggested that the “outcome” indicators 
might be more useful as information at the beginning of an assessment 
process—setting the context for looking at legal framework and 
government performance.] 
 
5. In assessing the legal framework, it is sometimes unclear whether a law was 
actually in force/implemented or not.   
 
6. The 3-level response set for compliance needs an “is fine” or “no problems” 
category.  It would help in the assessment to have more gradations than 
the current three.  
 
7. One of the panelists raised the issue of the indicators having a “common law 
bias” in the sense that they focus on “rights” rather than “remedies” 
(which is more associated with civil law systems).  An example might be 
FoA A-2 in which the law may provide a right to join a union but that 
right may be meaningless if the remedy—the penalty when that right is 
violated—is trivial.   
 
8. In assessing the legal framework, there were questions about whether 
regulations or “decrees” should be considered. 
 
9. An additional indicator might be whether or not the government collects and 
publishes relevant data on labor rights outcomes—where there is no 
information, one can make a judgment about the government’s lack of 
interest or decision not to report honestly. 
 
10. There was support for using newspaper data bases, if they exist—with the idea 
that media reports can provide “facts” (did a strike occur) but 
interpretations may reflect specific orientations.  From a business 
perspective, the Business and Human Rights website (UK) was also 




11. Transparency International (http://www.transparency.org/) was also 
mentioned as a possible source for WebMILS.  It focuses on civil society 
with an emphasis on corruption. 
 
12. Outcome measures, such as union density, are value neutral, purely factual—
This may be relevant in describing a country, but “compliance” categories 
are not applicable. 
 
13. With regard to the role of trafficking in forced or compulsory labor, reference 
was made to the UN’s Palermo Protocol as possibly relevant for 
assessments. 
 
14. Additional or alternative indicators for forced or compulsory labor:   
-is the government taking steps to prevent forced labor 
-extent of migrations, forced or not 
-extent of illegal migration 
-presence or absence of labor recruiters 
-extent of government regulation of labor recruiters, including 
regulations/limits on money or wages that can be withheld by 
recruiters 
-governmental role in sending/receiving remittances 
[a panelist suggested consulting a 2005 research report on exploitation 
of migrant workers by Verite, “Protecting Overseas Workers” 
(http://www.verite.org/)]  
 
15. In some instances, the group discussion appeared to lessen individual 
panelists’ confidence in their assessments 
 
16. The discussion revealed some overlap between “child labor” and forced or 
compulsory labor—e.g., a panelist mentioned the lack of attention to child 
soldiers in the indicators for forced labor, however this issue is included 
under child labor 
 
17. With regard to WebMILS, panelists suggested that a search tool would be 
very helpful, along the lines characteristic of Google searches.   
 
18. In the discussion of overall conclusions about the country, it was suggested 
that some form of prioritizing or a “weighting” system would be helpful to 
recognize differences in the practical importance of indicators.   
 
19 There was a generally positive response to the matrix approach as a tool for 




Country C (May 21-22, 2008) 
Labor Standards: Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 




• Business school professor teaching U.S. and international labor law 
• Executive for the U.S. office of a major international union organization 
• Senior program advisor with several labor rights NGOs  
 
The meeting began with a somewhat abbreviated discussion of the “either/or” questions, 
followed by a discussion of individual indicators, the matrix approach, and WebMILS.  
There was somewhat more agreement between individual panelists on their initial 
assessments of indicators.  With fewer instances of “low” agreement, the discussion of 
individual indicators addressed more that had “medium” agreement.  
 
The discussion of individual indicators was slightly varied in two ways based on the 
experience of the previous panel.  First, at the beginning of the main session, we provided 
each panelist a printout with the ratings of all three for each indicator (not including their 
comments).  In earlier discussions, panelists orally indicated how they rated the indicator 
at the beginning of the discussion of that indicator; in this iteration, panelists had the 
ratings in writing before they began the discussion of individual indicators.  This change 
appeared to quickly provide an initial framework for discussing an indicator.  It did not 
appear to change the nature of the discussion or outcome from that in the prior two 
panels.  
 
The second variation was tried to test whether the panelists could reach a consensus on 
their rating of individual indicators.  The plan was to have the each panelist re-assess the 
indicator in writing following discussion.  Once this individual re-assessment was 
completed, the panelists would seek to agree on a group assessment.  The intent of this 
approach was to be able to analyze the individual’s re-assessment (as with the other 
panels), but also to observe the more public effort to achieve consensus.  It quickly 
became clear that this approach was not productive and the results were revealing about 
the dynamics of trying to achieve a consensus on individual indicators when differences 
are not large and the evidence is incomplete or ambiguous.  In practice, the effort to reach 
a consensus on individual indicators was very time-consuming, with extensive discussion 
about small differences.  Panelists seemed to feel social pressure to make small 
modifications based on little firm data.  In the interests of time and maintaining a positive 
environment for the panel discussion, this attempt to reach an oral consensus on 
individual indicators was dropped and panel followed the pattern used in the previous 
two meetings, focusing on changes in individual re-assessments as an indication of the 
impact of the group discussion. 
 
Some points raised in the discussion: 
 
1. Initial discussion of the indicators of the legal framework suggested some 
differences in interpretation.  Some questions seemed to suggest that the 
indicator was intended to include the application of the law rather than just 
the “letter of the law.”  For example, FoA A-14 (“whether the principle of 
a strike as a means of action of organizations is generally recognized”) 
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suggested to some that the indicator was including how the law is 
implemented.  If the indicator was worded “whether the principle of a 
strike as a means of action of organizations is guaranteed,” it would be 
more clearly limited to the law itself.  Similarly, Discrimination A-9 
seems to emphasize how a law in implemented:   
 
whether there are laws that make nondiscrimination in 
employment meaningful in practice with equal access to 
education, training, vocational guidance, and placement 
services; maternity protection; and parental leave 
[emphasis added]. 
 
FoA A-20 also seems to ask about the effectiveness of the law:   
 
“assessment of extent to which “right to work” laws or 
other “free rider” provisions undermine the ability of 
workers to organize and the extent to which laws require 
workers to join a given trade union as a condition of 
employment or that new workers be hired through a given 
trade union” 
 
How should “practices” influence an assessment of the 
effectiveness of laws.  If strikers are stopped from picketing 
because they are “disturbing the peace” (not a part of labor law), is 
this evidence that “the government can limit picketing…” (FoA 
indicator A-16)? 
 
The panel discussion raised the question about whether regulations 
and court decisions and precedents should be considered part of the 
legal framework.  It was noted that in a “common-law” system, 
court cases are a key part of understanding the law.  Court 
interpretations are also relevant for understanding the operation of 
civil law regimes.  The question was raised about whether a “right” 
that is enunciated is really protected if the “remedy,” in terms of 
responses to violating this right, fails to ensure the respecting of 
the right.  For example, FoA A-8 refers to “whether national laws 
protect workers from discrimination if they join a union or 
participate in union activities.”  Assessing this might require 
knowing what the punishment is for violating this right. 
 
In discussing another aspect of the complexity of assessing the 
legal system, FoA A3, it was noted that the law protecting civil 
servants’ rights in Country C was conditioned on the passage of a 
separate law about civil servants that was never passed.   
 
2. The group talked about the problem of not having a clear time-frame for basing 
decisions about direction of change.  They noted that Country C had 
installed a democratic government a number of years ago and there have 
been many improvements in the labor standards environment since that 
change.  Whether there have been positive changes in the last five years, 
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however, was much more difficult to determine. 
 
There was also some sense that assessing direction of change suggested 
the idea of identifying a trajectory, making a judgment about whether 
things will be changing in the future.   
 
3. The panel raised the issue of what should be the basis of assessing level of 
compliance.  Although the panelists may not have explicitly decided on a 
comparative basis for decisions, it appeared that in some cases there was a 
de facto comparison with countries at similar levels of development (“not 
as bad as …”).   
 
4. There was some variation in the extent to which panelists allowed their general 
knowledge of a country’s environment to impact their assessments.  One 
panelist, in the absence of data, presumed that a particular kind of problem 
existed—based on his knowledge of the country. 
 
5. The panel discussed the importance of understanding the sources and their 
traditions.  For example, small changes in phrasing in reports of the ILO’s 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR) can be very important.  These might be 
overlooked by less-experienced assessors. 
 
6. Some of the indicators include more than one topic which confuses assessment.  
For example, FoA A-16 asks about restrictions on “picketing or 
occupation of the workplace.”  The latter is a much different activity than 
the former.  Similarly, FoA B-1 included job actions and crimes such as 
murder in a single indicator. 
 
7. In the course of doing his individual assessments, one panelist personally 
contacted an expert in the Department of State in order to get up-to-date 
information.  This raised the question about how such informal sources 
should be integrated with more established or freely-available sources. 
 
8. As with other country panels, the Country C panelist found the outcome 
indicators (FoA C-1 to C-3) difficult to interpret.  Although they assumed 
that the intent was that higher union density (C-1) is likely a sign of 
greater freedom of association, the indicator is a factual one and not one of 
“compliance.”  For number of strikes (C-2), it is unclear whether more 
strikes is a sign of an active and successful labor movement or of 
problems with the labor standards.  In terms of outcomes, it was noted that 
it would be useful to have some indicator of the level of awareness among 
workers of their rights.  There weren’t suggestions, however, of how this 
would be measured. 
 
9. The question was raised about the problem of moving from anecdotal evidence 
to an overall assessment of a country.  It was noted that there may be 
certain sectors that get disproportionate attention in the western press.  For 
example, apparel and toys, because of their western markets and consumer 
movements may skew the impression of the country as a whole.  
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10. There was often little information for assessing the indicators for 
“Discrimination and Equality.”  The range of bases for discrimination 
(gender, ethnicity, caste, etc.) also made it complex.  It was noted that 
there were few indicators for assessing discrimination within a country 
against internal migrants or indigenous people. 
 
11. In terms of the matrix approach generally, the panelists seemed to see it as a 
useful organization of information.  It might be that the “C” indicators 
(outcomes), rather than items for assessing “compliance,” might be used to 
provide an introductory context—a portrait of the labor conditions—for 
assessing the legal framework and the government performance.  
Understanding the national context should also involve some indications 





Matrixes for Assessors on the Three Panels 
 
 
Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)




A4(2), A12(2) A3(2), A11(3), A13(2), 
A19(2), A20(2), B1(2), 
B2(1), B4(2), B8(3)
Severe problems A2(1), A14(2) A6(2), A7(2), A8(2), 
A10(3), A15(2), A16(3), 
B3(2), B6(2)
(no assessment) A5(2), A18(), B7(), B9(), 
B10(), B11(), B12(), 
C1(3), C2(2), C3(2), C4()
Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)
Some problems A4(2), A5(2), A7(2), 
A21(2), B6(3)
A8(3), A10(2), A12(2), 





Severe problems B1(2) A6(3), A11(2), A14(3), 
A15(3), A16(3), C4(2)
(no assessment) C3(2) C1(2) A1(3), A9(3), A17(3), 
A18(), A19(3), A20(2), 
B5(2), B7(), B8(), B9(), 
B10(), B12(), B13(), 
C2(2)
Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)
Some problems A1(3), A2(3), A3(3), 
A8(3), A9(3), A11(3), 
A12(2), A13(3), A17(3), 
A18(2), A19(3), A20(2), 
A21(3), B4(2), B5(3), 




A5(3), A6(3), A10(3), 
A14(3), A16(3), B1(3), 
B3(3), B6(3), B11(2)








































Confidence in Assessment: 
 (1) = low confidence    
 (2) = moderate confidence 
 (3) = confident    
  ()  = no response 
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Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)
Some problems A2(3), A4(1), A6(3), 





Severe problems A1(3), A5(3), A11(3), 
A13(3), A14(3)
(no assessment) C3(1) C4(1), C5(2) A7(), A15(), B8(), B9(), 
B10(), B11(), B12(), 
B13(), C1(), C2()
Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)





Severe problems B3(2) B5(2), B6(2), B9(1), 
C4(3), C5(2)
(no assessment) C1(2), C3(3) A1(3), A2(3), A4(3), 
A5(3), A6(), A8(3), 




A19(3), B4(3), B7(), 
B8(), B10(), B11(), 
B12(), B13(), C2()
Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)
Some problems A1(3), A2(3), A3(3), 
A4(2), A9(3), A10(3), 
A15(3), A16(3), 
A17(3), A18(3), 
A19(3), B1(3), B2(), 





A5(3), A6(3), A12(2), 
A13(3), A14(3), B6(2), 
B7(2), B9(2), B10(2), 
B11(1), C5(1)
A7(3), A8(3)









































Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)
Some problems A2(2), A3(3), A4(3), 
A8(2), B2(2)
A5(2), A7(1), A10(3), 
A11(2), A13(3), A16(1), 
A19(2), A21(3), B3(1), 
B4(1) B (1) B (1)More extensive 
problems
A12(2) A6(3), A14(3), A17(), 
A18(2), A20(3), B1(2), 
B6(1), B8(1), B9(2), 
B10(2), B11(2), B12(1), 
B13(2), C1(3), C3(1), 
C4(1)
Severe problems A1(3), A9(3), A15(3)
(no assessment)
Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)
Some problems A2(3), A3(3), A4(3), 
A5(3), A6(3), A8(3), 
A10(3), A13(2), A20(3), 
B11(2), B13(2)
A7(2), A9(3), A11(3), 
A16(2), A18(2), A21(3), 




A12(3), A14(3) A15(2), A17(3), A19(2), 
B1(), B2(2), B12(2)
Severe problems A1(3), B3(2), B8(2), 
B9(2), B10(2), C1(), 
C3(2), C4(2)
(no assessment)
Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)
Some problems A3(), A6(2), A12(2), 
B9(3)






(no assessment) B10(3) A7(), A8(3), A9(3), 
A11(3), A15(1), A17(3), 
A19(3), A21(3), B1(2), 
B5(2)
A10(3), A16(1), A18(), 
A20(1), B2(), B3(), B4(), 
B6(), B7(), B12(), B13(), 






































Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)




A4(3), B4(2) B2(2), B3(1), B5(1), 
B7(1)
Severe problems B1(3), B6(1) C1(1), C2(1), C3(1), 
C4(1)
(no assessment)
Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)




B4(2), B7(2), B8(2), 
C4(2)





Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)





(no assessment) A1(), A2(3), A3(), B7(3) B4(), B5(), B6(), B8(), 
C1(2), C2(), C3(), C4()






































Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)
Some problems A1(3), A2(3), A3(3), 
A4(3), A5(3), A6(3), 
A7(3), A8(3), A9(3), 
( ) ( ) ( )More extensive 
problems
A11(2), A15(2), A19(2), 
A21(3), B8(2), B9(1), 
B10(1), B13(2), C1(3), 
C3(2)
B11(1)
Severe problems A14(3), B1(3), B2(3), 
B3(3), C2(2), C4(2)
(no assessment)
Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)
Some problems B5(2) A1(3), A5(1), A9(3), 




A2(2) A4(2), A7(2), A10(3), 
A11(2), A12(3), A13(2), 
A15(2), A21(3), B4(2), 
B9(1), B10(1), B11(1), 
B12(1), B13(2)
Severe problems A14(3) A3(3), A6(3), A8(3), 
A16(3), B1(3), B2(3), 
B3(3), B8(2)
(no assessment) C1(2) C2(1), C3(1), C4(1)
Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)
Some problems A1(3), A2(3), A5(2), 
A8(2), A9(3), A10(3), 
A11(2), A13(2), A18(1), 
A20(1), A21(3), B4(2), 





A3(3), A4(2), A6(3), 
A7(2), A12(3), A19(3), 
B1(3), B5(3), B7(1), 
B9(2), B10(2), B11(2), 
C1(1), C4(3)
A15(3)








































Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)
Some problems A9(2), B1(2) A1(3), A2(3), A3(3), 




A5(3) A6(2), A7(2), A10(3), 
B5(2), C1(3), C5(2), 
C6(2), C8(2), C9(2)
Severe problems
(no assessment) B3(), B4(), B6(), B7(), 
B8(), B9(), B11(), C3(), 
C4(), C10()
Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)




A5(3), C1(3) A6(2), A7(3), A8(2), 
B1(2), B5(2), B6(2), 
B8(1), B11(2), C2(2), 
C4(2)
C10(2)
Severe problems A9(2), A10() C6(2), C7(2), C9(3) C8(2)
(no assessment) B3(), B4(), B7(), C3(), 
C5()
Improving Steady state Worsening (no assessment)
Some problems A1(3), A2(3), A3(3), 




C1(3), C2(3) A8(2), A10(2), B1(1), 
B5(1), B7(1), B8(1), 
B9(1), B11(1), C3(1), 
C6(3), C7(1), C8(3)
C9(2)
Severe problems A5(2) A6(2), A7(2), B3(3), 
B4(2), C4(3), C5(3), 
C10(3)
(no assessment)










































Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
                         
Level of Compliance     Confidence (in initial assessment)   
Level of Compliance-
Revision   
Panelists   Panelists   Panelists 
      
Diff.





a b c     a b c   a b c   
A02 Severe More Some 4   Low High High   More More More 0 
A04 More Some Severe 4   Mod. Mod. High   More Some Severe 4 
A05   Some More     Mod. Mod. High     Some Some   
A07 Severe Some Severe 4   Mod. Mod. High   Severe More Severe 2 
A08 Severe Some Some 4   Mod. High High   Severe More More 2 
A10 Severe Some More 4   High Mod. High   More Some More 2 
A11 More Severe Some 4   High Mod. High   More  Severe Some 4 
A16 Severe Severe More     High High High     Severe More   
B02 More Some Severe 4   Low Mod. High   Some Some Severe 4 
B06 Severe Some More 4   Mod. High High   More Some More 2 
  Acceptable Conditions of Work 
A02 Some   Some     High High High   More More More   
A04 Some   Some     Low High Mod.   More Some Severe   
A05 Severe   More     High High High     Some Some   
A07   Some More       Mod. High   Severe More Severe   
A08 Some   More     High High High   Severe More More   
A10 Some   Some     High High High   More Some More   
A11 Severe   Severe     High High High   More Severe Some   
A16 Some   Some     High High High     Severe More   
B02 Some More Some 2   High Mod.     Some Some Severe 4 
B06 More Severe More 2   Mod. Mod. Mod.   More  Some More 2 
           





Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
                           
Level of Compliance  Confidence (in initial assessment)   Level of Compliance-Revised 
Panelists   Panelists   Panelists 
Indi-
cator 
a b c 
Diff.
Ind.   a b c   a b c 
Diff.
Ind. 
A02 Some Some Some 0   Mod. High High   Some Some Some 0 
A04 Some Some Some 0   High High High   Some Some Some 0 
A05 Some Some Some 0   Mod. High Mod.   Some Some Some 0 
A07 Some Some       Low Mod.     Some Some     
A08 Some Some       Mod. High High   Some Some     
A10 Some Some       High High High   Some Some     
A11 Some Some       Mod. High High   Some Some     
A16 Some Some       Low Mod. Low   Some Some     
B02 Some More       Mod. Mod.     Some More     
B06 More Some       Low Mod.     More Some     
                            
  Forced or Compulsory Labor 
B06 Severe More       Low Low     Severe Severe Some  4 
B07 More More       Low Mod. High   Some More Some  2 
B08 Some More       Low Mod.     Some More Some  2 
C01 Severe More       Low Low Mod.   Severe More     
C04 Severe More       Low Mod.     Severe More More  2 
           





Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining 
                         
Level of Compliance  Confidence (in initial assessment)   Level of Compliance--Revisions 
Panelists   Panelists   Panelists 
Indi-
cator 
a b c 
Diff. 
Ind.   a b c   a b c 
Diff.
Ind. 
A02 Some More Some 2   High Mod. High   Some More Some 2 
A04 Some More More 2   High Mod. Mod.   Some More More 2 
A05 Some Some Some 0   High Low Mod.   Some Some Some 0 
A07 Some More More 2   High Mod. Mod.   Some More More 2 
A08 Some Severe Some 4   High High Mod.   Some More More 2 
A10 Some More Some 2   High High High   Some More Some 2 
A11 More More Some 2   Mod. Mod. Mod.   More More Some 2 
A16 Some Severe Severe 4   Mod. High High   Some Severe More 4 
B02 Severe Severe Severe 0   High High Mod.   Severe Severe Severe 0 
B06 Some Some Some 0   Low Low Mod.   Some Some Some 0 
  Discrimination and Equality 
A05 More More Severe 2   High High Mod.   More More More 0 
A08 Some More More 2   High Mod. Mod.   Some More More 2 
A09 Some Severe Some 4   Mod. Mod. Mod.   Some More Some 2 
A10 More Severe More 2   High   Mod.   More Severe Some 4 
B01 Some More More 2   Mod. Mod. Low   More More Some 2 
B06   More Some       Mod. Mod.   More More Some   
B09   Some More       Mod. Low   Some Some More   
C07 Some Severe More 4   Mod. Mod. Low   More More Some 2 
C10   More Severe       Mod. High   More More Severe   
                            







Commentary by Panelists on Specific Indicators 
 
Issues arising in application of the indicators in the pilot test 
 
Freedom of Association 
 
A-01. whether the country has ratified ILO 
convention No. 87 
Suggests binary response: yes or no--not some 
problems, more extensive problems, or severe 
problems 
 
A-02. whether there are legal provisions 
that entitle workers or employers to 
establish and join organizations of their 
own choosing without previous 
authorization 
Double-barreled question:  “without prior 
authorization” confuses question (if referring to 
“registration” of unions, should say this);  
“registering”; combines workers joining unions with 
separate issue of employers forming associations 
Wording and intent: Government’s discretion to 
certify or not extends the indicator beyond legal 
provisions 
A-03. the extent to which there are legal 
restrictions on the ability of certain 
categories of workers to organize (such as 
civil servants, teachers, or workers without 
contracts of employment), and numbers of 
workers in each category 
Wording and intent:  "numbers of workers in each 
category” extends the indicator beyond legal 
framework to impact of its application 
A-04. whether there are certain sectors 
where there is no right to organize (such as 
in export processing zones or in other 
tradable sectors or in agricultural and 
informal sectors) 
Wording and intent: appears to extend beyond legal 
framework to application of law to particular 
workplaces/industries 
A-05. whether there are other forms of 
distinction or discrimination in right to 
organize, such as race, nationality, sex, 
opinion, political affiliation, or citizenship 
(for example, excluding legal immigrants) 
 Suggests binary response: yes or no, although may 
imply gradations of compliance depending upon 
extent of limitations 
Wording and intent: Discrimination may extend 
beyond labor law, such as banning publications in 
foreign languages 
A-06. whether there are legal provisions 
that permit the government to interfere in 
freedom of association by workers or 
employers 
Wording and intent:  appears to require going beyond 
the legal framework to look at how the law is 
applied; question about what is meant by "interfere in 
freedom of association" 
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A-07. whether there are legal restrictions 
on political activities of unions and 
employers' organization, either by 
establishing a close relationship between 
trade union organization and political 
parties, or by prohibiting all political 
activities for trade unions (including 
making financial contributions to a 
political party or candidate) 
  
A-08. whether national laws protect 
workers from discrimination if they join a 
union or participate in union activities 
Suggests binary response: “Yes, national law protects 
workers” 
Wording and intent:  appears to require going beyond 
the legal framework to look at how the law is applied 
 
A-09. whether the country has ratified 
Convention No. 98 (collective bargaining) 
Suggests binary response 
A-10. whether collective bargaining is 
protected in law 
Answer set problem: needs “no problems” as 
possible response 
A-11. whether there are legal restrictions 
on the mechanism of collective bargaining 
(such as the mandatory exclusion of some 
issues or the ability of employers to refuse 
to bargain with a recognized union) 
Wording and intent:  appears to require going beyond 
the legal framework to look at how the law is 
applied--practical restrictions may not be in the law, 
but in its application 
Double-barreled question: Difficult to determine 
level of compliance when parenthetical examples of 
restrictions are qualitatively different 
A-12. the extent to which there are 
categories of workers not permitted to 
negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement (such as civil servants, teachers, 
or workers in special activities), and 
numbers of workers in each such category 
Wording and intent:  appears to require going beyond 
the legal framework to look at how the law is applied 
A-13. whether there are certain sectors 
where there is no right to negotiate a 
collective bargaining agreement (such as 
in export processing zones or in other 
tradable sectors, or in agricultural and 
informal sectors 
Wording and intent:  appears to require going beyond 
the legal framework to look at how the law is 
applied; parenthetical examples of informal sector, 
export processing zones, agriculture are  qualitatively 
different 
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A-14. whether the principle of a strike as a 
means of action of organizations is 
generally recognized 
Wording and intent:  “generally recognized” implies 
going beyond the legal framework to look at how the 
law is applied 
A-15. the extent to which the government 
can forbid certain kinds of strikes (such as 
"protest strikes," "sympathy strikes," "go 
slow" strikes, or "work-to-rule" 
slowdown), or strikes under certain 
conditions (such as economic or political 
"crisis"), or strikes requiring a majority of 
workers involved to authorize a strike 
Double-barreled question:  single indicators 
encompasses qualitatively different situations (types 
of strikes and types of conditions) 
Wording and intent:  WebMILS explanation of this 
indicator suggests that indicator should read:  
“…government can forbid…strikes that did not have 
approval from a majority of the workers involved.” 
A-16. the extent to which the government 
can limit picketing or occupation of the 
workplace 
Wording and intent:  appears to go beyond legal 
framework of industrial relations because actions 
against picketing and occupation of the workplace 
are usually taken under other parts of law (e.g., 
maintaining public order) 
Double-barreled question: picketing and occupying 
the workplace are qualitatively different 
A-17. whether legal regulations ban 
employer lockouts 
Suggests binary response:  could be re-written with 
"to what extent" instead of "whether" they exist in 
law 
A-18. whether workers are legally able to 
ratify or reject agreements reached by 
union leaders 
Compliance question:  unclear whether this 
corresponds to an international standard; union 
democracy internally is usually is regulated in a 
union’s constitution and bylaws in national law but  
A-19. whether legal regulations permit 
employers to dismiss striking workers, or 
permit hiring of permanent strike 
replacement workers 
Wording and intent:  appears to go beyond legal 
framework to practice 
A-20. assessment of extent to which "right 
to work" laws or other "free rider" 
provisions undermine the ability of 
workers to organize and the extent to 
which laws require workers to join a given 
trade union as a condition of employment 
or that new workers be hired through a 
given trade union 
Wording and intent:  part of labor-relations 
discussion in U.S., but less universally applicable 
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A-21. whether workers' and employers' 
organizations may legally affiliate with 
international bodies 
Wording and intent:  some question about meaning 
of "affiliate" and whether this extends to received 
financial assistance from international groups 
B-01. the extent to which union organizers 
are jailed or exiled by the government, or 
fired, injured, or murdered without prompt 
and effective prosecution on the part of the 
government 
Double-barreled question:  combines actions with 
very different levels of severity and sanctions; 
perhaps a question is needed about the effectiveness 
of the judicial process in such instances 
B-02. the extent to which strikers suffer 
retaliation without prompt and effective 
prosecution on the part of the government 
Double-barreled question: combines a question about 
employer actions (retaliation) with governmental 
response in case of such retaliation 
B-03. whether there are defects in the 
government's complaint process, such as 
excessive delays or expenses, light 
penalties, or nonpunishment of offenders 
Little or no information 
B-04. the extent to which the government 
interferes in freedom of association (e.g., 
by declaration of martial law, "state of 
crisis," or by suspension or dissolution of 
associations by administrative authority) 
Wording and intent:  unclear whether the examples 
are intended to restrict indicator to discretionary 
governmental actions and/or emergency decrees); 
otherwise, overlaps with B01-B03 
B-05. the independence of trade unions 
from political control 
 
B-06. the ability of trade unions to provide 
support for political parties and candidates 
Wording and intent:  unclear what is included in 
"support"  
B-07. government actions to combat labor-
related corruption (such as control of 
unions by criminal figures for use as a 
protection racket or for financial 
skimming) without prompt and effective 
prosecution 
No information found by any of the panels 
B-08. the adequacy of personnel and 
budgets of labor regulation departments 
compared to number of workplaces, the 
frequency and adequacy of labor 
inspections, the caseloads of labor 
administrative bodies and labor court, and 
whether bribes are paid to labor inspectors 
by employers without effective 
prosecution 
Double-barreled question:  combines a number of 
different questions;  also, difficult to define threshold 
for "adequacy" 
Little or no information 
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B-09 the efforts by national, state or 
provincial, and municipal authorities to 
educate workers about their rights and 
remedies and of the effectiveness of those 
efforts 
Little or no information 
B-10. the efforts on the part of national, 
state or provincial, and municipal 
authorities to engage in capacity-building 
for governmental officials with 
responsibility for labor matters and of the 
effectiveness of those efforts 
Little or no information found 
B-11. governmental actions in 
encouraging consultation and in 
facilitating dissemination of best practices 
in labor-management cooperation, through 
unions, employer groups, labor-
management organizations, labor-oriented 
NGOs, and tripartite social dialogue 
Little or no information found 
B-12. government actions in hindering or 
facilitating the formation and functioning 
of labor-advocate NGOs and of 
independent labor inspection, monitoring, 
and certification organizations 
Little or no information found 
B-13. government actions in encouraging 
and enabling utilization of domestic and 
international channels about problems, 
difficulties, or violations of freedom of 
association and effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining 
Little or no information found  
C-01. union density Factual question, not "compliance:"  perhaps more 
useful as a descriptor of context; difficult to interpret 
in practice 
C-02. frequency, length, and person-days 
of legal strikes 
Factual question, not "compliance:"  perhaps more 
useful as a descriptor of context; difficult to interpret 
in practice 
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C-03. percentage of workers covered by 
collective bargaining agreements 
Factual question; not "compliance"--perhaps more 
useful as a descriptor of context; also little or dated 
information; P2D: International Yearbook on Labor 
Statistics (World Bank) is not available online; P3D:  
compliance is not the right term, BUT would be 
positive if a high % of workers are covered by 
agreements 
C-04. incidents of discrimination against 
union organizers, unions, or employer 
associations 
Double-barreled question:  discrimination against 
employer associations is qualitatively different than 
against unions--may be more related to civil liberties 
than labor rights; also discrimination against union 
organizers is qualitatively different from 
discrimination against workers 




Forced or Compulsory Labor 
 
A-01. ratification of ILO Convention No. 
29 (forced labor, 1930, in response to 
concerns about “native labor in colonial 
contexts) 
Suggests binary response  
A-02. ratification of ILO Convention No. 
105 (forced labor, 1957, in response to 
forced labor camps as political 
punishment and discrimination) 
Suggests binary response 
A-03. ratification of ILO Convention No. 
182 (worst forms of child labor, 1999) 
Suggests binary response  
A-04. constitutional provisions, statutes, 
or regulations prohibiting the principal 
forms of forced labor 
  
B-01. an effective system of labor 
inspection with responsibility for 
identifying, remedying, and enforcing 
forced labor prohibitions 
  
B-02. an independent judiciary to redress 
forced labor violations 
Double-barreled question:  combines question about 
whether there is there a judiciary that addresses forced 
labor with whether it is independent 
B-03. courts with authority to order fines 
and penal sanctions, including 
incarceration, for forced labor violations 
Wording and intent:  asks about judiciary's authority, 
not whether the law authorizes incarceration for 
forced labor violations--part of ILO Convention 29 
B-04. community awareness and use of 
local vigilance committee to identify and 
monitor forced labor situations 
Wording and intent:  term "vigilance committees" 
used primarily in India; is this intended to apply 
generally to community groups that assume similar 
responsibilities? 
B-05. government sponsored credit 
institutions 
Wording and intent:  not a clear connection with 
forced labor--very relevant re places with extensive 
bonded labor-such as India--indicator could be 
prefaced with "If bonded labor is present,…" 
Alternative indicators could ask about government’s 
efforts to prevent recruitment of people in forced 
labor situations; preventative steps the government is 
taking such as regulating labor recruiters and 
employment agencies 
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B-06. national, state, and local resources 
devoted to identification, remediation, 
and enforcement, measured by: the 
percentage of labor department budget 
devoted to enforcement of forced labor 
prohibition; the number of labor 
inspectors per 100,000 workers in the 
formal and informal sectors; and annual 
arrests, prosecutions, and penalties for 
crimes related to forced labor 
Wording and intent: perhaps should be: "national, 
state, and local resources devoted to identification, 
remediation, and enforcement of forced labor 
provisions" with rest of original indicator either as 
examples for assessors; little information found 
B-07. receipt of technical assistance from 
the ILO, U.S. government, or other 
sources for:  establishing statutory and 
regulatory schemes; establishing a system 
of labor inspection; establishing 
rehabilitation systems 
Double-barreled indicator:  it could be possibly 
separated into three indicators reflecting:  the 
statutory system, labor inspections, and rehabilitation; 
a question was also raised about whether "level of 
compliance" is appropriate--while it demonstrates a 
country's efforts, there is not ILO convention setting a 
standard for accepting technical assistance 
B-08. government support of NGO 
activities related to forced labor, such as 
victim rehabilitation services, advocacy 
and awareness-raising programs, and 
microcredit lending practices 
 Little or no information 
C-01. statistics and reports on the number 
of persons that have been taken out of 
forced labor 
 Little or no information 
C-02. statistics and reports of persons 
who have been rehabilitated from forced 
labor 
Little information and what exists is not current 
C-03. statistics and reports of persons 
who have returned to forced labor 
Little information found 
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C-04. statistics on the number of workers 
still in the prohibited forms of forced 
labor:  slavery and abductions; 
compulsory participation in public works 
projects; coercive recruitment systems, 
particularly in rural areas; bonded labor, 
including bonded child labor; trafficking 
in persons; domestic workers in forced 
labor situations; prison labor and 
rehabilitation through work 







A-01. ratification of ILO Convention 100 
on equal remuneration 
Suggests binary response  
A-02. ratification of ILO Convention No 
111 on discrimination (employment and 
occupation) 
Suggests binary response 
A-03. ratification of the U.N. 
International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
Suggests binary response 
A-04. ratification of the U.N. Convention 
on the Elimination of Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 
Suggests binary response 
A-05. whether there are laws that prohibit 
discrimination in employment on the 
grounds of race, color, sex (including 
sexual harassment), religion, political 
opinion, national extraction, and social 
origin 
  
A-06. whether there are laws that cover 
additional grounds on which employment 
discrimination is prohibited, for example 
disability or sexual orientation 
Wording and intent:  appears to require going beyond 
the legal framework to look at how the law is applied 
A-07. whether there are laws that also 
protect migrant workers from 
discrimination in employment 
Wording and intent:  question about application to 
internal migrants; also question about whether 
indigenous peoples are protected; some ambiguity 
about whether the question also refers to protection 
of out-migrants from the country 
A-08. whether there are laws that prohibit 
discrimination in access to and ownership 
of assets, including property ownership, 
inheritance, and access to other assets or 
credit 
Wording and intent:  extends beyond legal 
framework to implementation of the law (e.g., in 
cases of restrictions on rights of women and certain 
ethnic groups) 
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A-09. whether there are laws that make 
nondiscrimination in employment 
meaningful in practice with equal access 
to education, training, vocational 
guidance, and placement services; 
maternity protection; and parental leave 
Wording and intent:  "meaningful in practice" implies 
going beyond the letter of the law to its 
implementation 
A-10. Whether there are laws or a legally 
established or recognized machinery for 
wage determination that ensure equal 
remuneration for work of equal value 
Wording and intent: no provisions in law, but 
regulatory controls exist 
Little or no information 
B-01. whether there is a national 
mechanism to promote equality and 
whether it has an employment focus or 
employment component in a broader 
policy 
 Little or no information 
B-02. whether the country has a labor 
inspectorate 
Suggests binary response  
B-03 the breadth of labor inspections in 
the country, in terms of number of visits, 
frequency of visits, number of workers 
covered, etc. 
Factual question, not "compliance;"  unclear what 
standard to use to assess compliance 
B-04. the level of resources devoted to the 
labor inspectorate in terms of number of 
personnel and budget, absolute or relative 
to number of workers or spending 
Little or no information found 
B-05. whether nondiscrimination issues 
are explicitly included in later inspections 
and inspectors trained in them 
Little or no information found 
B-06. whether there is a grievance 
mechanism for airing and investigating 
discrimination complaints, “whistle-
blowers” or complainant are protected 
from retaliation, and the grievance 
mechanism is adequately supported and 
funded 
Little or no information found; possible that if no 
information exists for this indicator, then that 
suggests no programs exist 
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B-07. measures of utility of grievance 
procedures, including number of 
complaints, length of process, penalties 
imposed in complaints upheld, and annual 
prosecutions and fines for violations of 
nondiscrimination laws 
Little or no information found 
B-08. where applicable, whether there are 
affirmative action programs aimed at 
promoting equality and not at elevating 
one group over another 
 Little or no information found 
B-09. whether there are public education 
or sensitivity campaigns, both to 
education vulnerable citizens about their 
rights and to change cultural and 
traditional attitudes that contribute to 
discrimination 
Suggests binary response 
Little or no information found 
 
B-10. whether there are requests for or 
implementation of International technical 
assistance programs, which can signal 
improvements in government efforts and, 
possibly, effectiveness 
 Suggests binary response 
Wording and intent: phrase beginning with “which 
can signal…” explains the rationale for the indicator 
but it also extends it to assessing   “effectiveness” of 
government programs 
B-11. whether there are relevant 
supportive policies, such as child care 
Little or no information found 
C-01. differences in illiteracy rates 
between men and women and among 
different ethnic, racial, religious, or other 
groups 
 Little information on ethnic, racial and religious 
groups 
C-02. differences in school enrollment 
rates (primary, secondary, and tertiary, or 
combined) between men and women and 
among different ethnic, racial, religious, 
or other groups 
 Little or no information found on ethnic and 
religious groups 
C-03. differences in vocational training 
enrollment rates between men and women 
and among different ethnic, racial 
religious, or other vulnerable groups 
Little or no information found 
C-04. documented discriminatory 
practices, such as widespread sexual 
harassment or pregnancy testing for job 
applicants 
Little information in WebMILS; some information 
found in reports of the Asian Development Bank and 
news sources 
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C-05. employment status—wage or 
salaried worker, self-employed, or 
contributing family member 
Little information found; information that was found 
(e.g., women's labor force participation rates) was 
difficult to interpret and apply 
C-06. distribution of women and other 
potentially vulnerable groups by sector 
Wording and intent:  unclear wording 
C-07. distribution of employment in the 
urban informal sector 
 Wording and intent: unclear what is being asked; for 
example, does indicator ask about number of workers 
in the urban informal sector or their distribution 
within the informal sector? 
C-08. distribution of women and other 
potentially vulnerable groups by 
occupation within sectors, including in 
administrative and management positions 
  
C-09. relative unemployment rates, 
especially changes over time and during 
adjustments 
Wording and intent: what is meant by "during 
adjustments" 
C-10. relative wage data could be an 
indirect indicator of occupational or 
sectoral discrimination that channels 
women and minorities into lower paid 
types of jobs, but they are not available 
for large numbers of countries or 
consistently over time 
Wording and intent: unclear wording; descriptive of 






Acceptable Conditions of Work 
 
A-01. ratification of ILO Convention No. 
131 on minimum wage fixing machinery 
Suggests binary response 
A-02. national constitution or law 
establishing one or more minimum wages 
Suggests binary response 
A-03. application of the minimum wage 
law or laws (to whom do the minimum 
wage law/laws apply?  Do the legal 
minimums vary by geographic region, 
economic sector, and/or by establishment 
size?) 
Double-barreled question:  asks a number of different 
questions about the minimum wage 
A-04. minimum wage level(s) specified 
in the law (in local currency and in US. 
Dollars and, if possible, adjusted using 
the World Bank's Purchasing Power 
Parity exchange rate for the local 
currency) 
Factual question, not "compliance:"  perhaps more 
useful as a descriptor of context; difficult to assess in 
terms of compliance 
A-05. ratification of ILO Convention No. 
1, 30, or 47, limiting the regular 
workweek to 48 hours or less 
Suggests binary response; in case of the country under 
review, these ILO conventions were not ratified, but 
the national law meets the relevant standards 
A-06. national constitutional or legal 
provision for a regular workweek of 48 
hours or less 
Suggests binary response 
A-07. the coverage of laws limiting the 
regular workweek (e.g., only 
establishments of a certain size, only 
those in certain industrial sectors or 
regions) 
Wording and intent:  questions about the 
implementation of the law, particularly because of the 
high incidence of informal employment and  
unregistered workplaces 
A-08. provision in national laws or 
regulations for overtime beyond the 
regular workweek 
Suggests binary response 
A-09. ratification of ILO Convention No. 
14, providing a weekly day of rest 
Suggests binary response 
A-10. provision in the national 
constitution or law for a weekly day of 
rest 
Suggests binary response 
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A-11. ratification of ILO Convention No. 
101, providing paid holidays for 
agricultural workers 
Suggests binary response 
A-12. provision in the national 
constitution or laws for paid holidays for 
agricultural workers 
Suggests binary response 
A-13. ratification of ILO Convention No. 
52, providing for an annual paid holiday 
of at least 6 days 
Suggests binary response 
A-14. ratification of ILO Convention No. 
132, providing for an annual paid holiday 
of at least three weeks (supersedes ILO 
Convention 52) 
Suggests binary response 
A-15. provision in national 
laws/constitution for a specified number 
of paid holidays for employed workers 
Suggests binary response; the number of paid 
holidays could provide a basis for rank-order response 
A-16 ratification of ILO Convention No. 
81, on labor inspection 
Suggests binary response 
A-17. provision in national laws for 
inspection of workplaces 
Suggests binary response 
A-18. ratification of ILO Convention 
No.155 on mechanism to provide health 
and safety 
Suggests binary response 
A-19. provision in the national 
constitution or laws for workplace health 
and safety 
Suggests binary response 
B-01. a mechanism for fixing minimum 
wages 
 Suggests binary response 
B-02. an agency to promote and enforce 
laws governing hours of work 
Suggests binary response; more information about 
this agency could be developed with questions 
comparable to those for the labor inspectorate (B-04 - 
B-07) 
B-03. an agency to promote and enforce 
laws protecting occupational health and 
safety 
Suggests binary response; no indicators about 
effectiveness of health and safety inspections; could 
be expanded with questions comparable to those for 
the labor inspectorate (B-04 - B-07) 
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B-04. a labor inspectorate Suggests binary response 
B-05. the breadth of labor inspections in 
the country (number and frequency of 
visits, geographic regions, or industry 
sectors inspected) 
  
B-06. the level of resources (e.g., 
personnel, pay, or budget) devoted to the 
labor inspectorate 
  
B-07. a labor inspectorate trained to and 
focused on wages, hours, and 
occupational safety and health standards 
Little or no information 
B-08. an administrative or judicial 
complaint mechanism 
Little or no information 
B-09. effectiveness of the complaint 
mechanism (in such terms as number of 
complaints brought compared with 
number of complaints heard, number of 
prosecutions, fines, or arrests, and length 
of time for complaint resolution 
Little or no information; also combines a number of 
questions/indicators 
 
B-10. government programs to combat 
problems in the areas of wages, hours, 
and occupation safety and health 
Little or not information; unclear how this is 
distinguished from questions about a labor 
inspectorate 
B-11. government-sponsored education 
programs focusing on wages, hours, and 
occupation safety and health 
Little or no information 
B-12. government receipt of international 
technical assistance in the areas of wages, 
hours, and occupational safety and health 
Little or no information 
B-13. government support for NGO 
activities designed to improve compliance 
with wage, hour, and occupational safety 
and health laws 
Little or no information 
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C-01. average and median manufacturing 
wages compared with minimum wage(s) 
in local currency and in U.S. dollars 
Factual question, not "compliance:"  perhaps more 
useful as a descriptor of context; difficult to interpret 
in practice 
C-02. average earnings in industries that 
export to the United States 
Factual question, not "compliance:"  perhaps more 
useful as a descriptor of context; difficult to interpret 
in practice; focusing on exports to the US does not 
contribute to an assessment of labor rights generally 
C-3. average hours worked per week Factual question, not "compliance;" unclear what 
standard would be used to assess average number of 
hours worked  
C-04. number of work-related fatalities 
per 100,000 workers, both overall and by 
industry sectors 
Factual question, not "compliance;" unclear would be 
a comparative standard 
C-05. number of occupational injuries, 
both absolute and as a fraction of the total 
workforce and the workforce covered by 
health and safety laws 
Factual question, not "compliance;" unclear would be 
a comparative standard 
 
 
